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  Introduction	  
	  
We	   live	   in	   a	   time	   in	   which	   the	   protection	   and	   preservation	   of	  marine	   biodiversity	   is	  
gaining	   increasing	   importance.	   The	  United	  Nations	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	  
(UNCLOS	   or	   LOSC)	   in	   1982	   already	   incorporated	   various	   environmental	   protection	  
elements,	   and	   the	   1992	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   gave	   the	   protection	   and	  
preservation	  of	  biodiversity	  legal	  status.1	  Since	  then,	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  
marine	   biodiversity	   and	   sustainable	   development	   have	   been	   important	   international	  
and	  national	  goals.	  The	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (ICRW	  or	  
the	  International	  Whaling	  Convention)	  and	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  
Bears	   (the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement)	  both	  offer	   extensive	   conservation	  measures,	  with	   a	  
moratorium	  on	  whaling,	  and	  an	  overall	  ban	  on	  polar	  bear	  hunting	  in	  the	  Arctic.	  	  
We	   also	   live	   in	   a	   time	   in	  which	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   rights	   is	   increasingly	  
important,	  especially	  for	  indigenous	  peoples.	  The	  modern	  framework	  for	  the	  protection	  
of	  indigenous	  rights	  started	  to	  develop	  in	  1989	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  ILO	  Convention	  169	  
on	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples.	   This	  was	   followed	   by	   a	   long	   period	   of	  
negotiation	  about	  a	  draft	  declaration	  on	  the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	  which	  finally	  
led	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	  
Peoples	  (UNDRIP)	  in	  2007.	  The	  most	  important	  right	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  the	  right	  
of	  self-­‐determination,	  allowing	  them	  to	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  so	  that	  they	  are	  able	  
to	   continue	   their	   traditional	  way	  of	   life.	   Linked	   to	   that	   is	   the	   right	   to	   culture,	   and	   the	  
right	  to	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources.	  	  	  
	   These	  increasingly	  important	  rights	  and	  duties	  at	  a	  first	  glance	  might	  clash.	  How	  
can	  an	  indigenous	  people’s	  right	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals	  coincide	  with	  a	  state’s	  duty	  
to	  protect	  and	  preserve	  those	  animals?	  Both	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Convention	  and	  
the	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement	   offer	   solutions	   for	   this	   potential	   conflict.	   The	   Polar	   Bear	  
Agreement	   is	  always	  used	  as	  an	  example	  of	  successful	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Arctic	  
states,	  and	  the	  “whale	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  world	  environmental	  movement	  
and	  has	  come	  to	  represent,	  perhaps	  better	  than	  any	  other	  single	  issue,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
reconciling	   the	   need	   to	   conserve	   biological	   diversity,	   protect	   cultural	   and	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (1992).	  
2	  Philippe	  Sands	  and	  Jacqueline	  Peel,	  Principles	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law	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values,	  and	  give	  effect	  to	  economic	  needs.”2	  In	  that	  context,	  both	  treaties	  proclaim	  a	  duty	  
to	   protect	   and	   preserve	   the	  marine	  mammals,	   but	   both	   offer	   an	   exemption	   from	   that	  
duty	  to	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
	   Within	   this	   context,	   how	   does	   international	   law	   recognize	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   to	   harvest	  marine	  mammals?	   The	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   can	   be	  
seen	   not	   only	   through	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	   human	   rights	   lawyer,	   who	   focuses	   solely	   on	   the	  
international	  human	  rights	   instruments	  and	  case	   law	  available	   to	  her,	  but	  also	  via	   the	  
perspective	   of	   international	   law	   of	   the	   sea	   and	   environmental	   law,	   drawing	   from	   the	  
Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention,	  and	  the	  whaling	  and	  polar	  bear	  conventions	  themselves.	  This	  
thesis	  will	  take	  on	  both	  these	  perspectives,	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  rights	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals.	  The	  two	  different	  perspectives	  
have	   several	   things	   in	   common,	   and	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   they	   should	   be	   used	   and	  
interpreted	  complementary	  to	  each	  other.	  	  	  
	   The	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  clarify	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘indigenous	  
peoples.’	  It	  will	  describe	  the	  historical	  context	  to	  the	  question,	  and	  compare	  the	  human	  
rights	   definitions	   and	   the	   law	   of	   the	   sea	  meaning	   of	   the	  word.	   It	  will	   also	   distinguish	  
indigenous	  peoples	  from	  other	  minorities.	  By	  doing	  so,	  it	  will	  clarify	  the	  most	  essential	  
elements	   of	   a	   definition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Having	  
established	  the	  interpretational	  background,	  the	  second	  chapter	  will	  then	  reflect	  on	  the	  
rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals	  as	  seen	   from	  the	  eyes	  of	   the	  
human	  rights	  lawyer.	  It	  will	  draw	  upon	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
culture,	  and	  how	  that	  ties	  into	  the	  marine	  mammals	  debate.	  The	  third	  chapter	  will	  offer	  
the	  perspective	   of	   the	   international	   law	  of	   the	   sea	   scholar,	   by	   looking	   at	  UNCLOS,	   the	  
ICRW,	  and	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement.	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  indigenous	  exemptions	  will	  be	  
explored,	   as	   will	   the	   actual	   substance,	   and	   some	   limitations.	   Whilst	   doing	   so,	   it	   will	  
become	  clear	  how	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  perspective	  subtly	  relies	  on	  human	  rights	  law,	  and	  
thus	  how	   the	   two	   fields	  of	   law	  are	   complementary	   to	  each	  other	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  
rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals.	  
	   This	   thesis	   relies	   upon	   both	   primary	   and	   secondary	   sources.	   Primary	   sources	  
include	   the	  various	   treaties,	   reports	  and	  decisions	   from	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  
preparatory	  works,	  and	  reports	  from	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Commission	  (IWC),	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Philippe	  Sands	  and	  Jacqueline	  Peel,	  Principles	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  423.	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organizational	   body	   of	   the	   ICRW.	  Due	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   thesis,	   there	   is	   a	   stronger	  
reliance	  on	  secondary	  sources,	  especially	   in	   the	  parts	  on	   the	   ICRW	  and	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  
Agreement.	  This	   is	  a	  potential	   shortcoming,	  and	   further	   research,	  with	  more	   time	  and	  
space,	   would	   therefore	   want	   to	   pursue	   even	   more	   primary	   sources,	   such	   as	   all	   the	  
various	  reports	  by	  the	  IWC.	  	  
	   4	  
1	  Defining	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   internationally	   legally	   binding	   definition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   and	  
therefore	  the	  term	  can	  cause	  confusion.	  For	  example,	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  has	  long	  
argued	   that	   its	   small	   type	   coastal	   whaling	   (STCW)	   should	   fall	   under	   the	   aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling	  exception	  of	  the	  ICRW.	  However,	  many	  people	  would	  not	  associate	  
the	  Japanese	  with	  the	  term	  ‘indigenous	  peoples’.	  People	  would	  rather	  think	  of	  the	  Inuit	  
or	  First	  Nations	  in	  Canada,	  the	  Native	  Americans	  in	  North	  and	  South	  America,	  the	  Sami	  
in	   Scandinavia	   and	  Russia,	   or	   the	   aboriginals	   in	   Australia.	  Why	   are	   only	   those	   people	  
considered	   indigenous,	   and	   not	   the	   Japanese?	  What,	   actually	   are	   indigenous	   peoples?	  
How	  is	   the	  term	  defined	   in	  human	  rights	   law,	  and	  how	  in	   international	  environmental	  
law	  and	  law	  of	  the	  sea?	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  deal	  with	  these	  questions,	  as	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  who	  we	  
mean	   by	   indigenous	   peoples,	   before	   going	   in	   to	   analyse	   what	   rights	   these	   people	  
actually	   have.	   Also	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   Japanese	   whaling,	   defining	  
indigenous	  peoples	  would	  help	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Commission	  in	  deciding	  which	  
groups	  of	  people	  qualify	  for	  an	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  quota,	  and	  which	  do	  not.	  
The	  chapter	  will	   take	  a	   three-­‐tier	  approach.	  First	  of	  all,	   the	   term	  “indigenous	  peoples”	  
will	   be	  explored	   from	  a	  human	   rights	  based	  perspective.	   Secondly,	   it	  will	   look	  at	  how	  
indigenous	  peoples	   are	  defined	  or	   referred	   to	   in	   international	   environmental	   law	  and	  
the	  law	  of	  the	  sea.	  Thirdly,	  this	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  distinction	  between	  minorities	  
and	   indigenous	   peoples	   within	   human	   rights	   law.	   The	   outcomes	   of	   these	   three	  
discussions	   help	   us	   to	   understand	   what	   and	   who	   indigenous	   peoples	   are,	   and	   it	   will	  
allow	  us	  to	  form	  a	  common	  understanding	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
1.1	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  
Mattias	  Åhrén	  explains	  how	   there	  are	   two	  ways	  of	  defining	  a	  people	   for	   international	  
legal	   purposes.	   In	   Westphalian	   times,	   peoples	   were	   defined	   as	   “the	   aggregate	   of	   the	  
individuals	  that	  happened	  to	  reside	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  states	  that	  took	  form	  [after	  
the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  in	  1648].”3	  	  This	  definition	  never	  applied	  to	  indigenous	  peoples,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Mattias	  Åhrén,	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Relevant	  to	  Natural	  Resource	  
Extraction	  in	  Indigenous	  Territories	  –	  An	  Overview,”	  Nordisk	  Miljörättslig	  Tidskrift	  /	  
Nordic	  Environmental	  Law	  Journal	  1	  (2014),	  22.	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because	  of	  the	  allegedly	  primitive	  nature	  of	  their	  societies.	  This	  meant	  that,	  for	  as	  long	  as	  
that	  definition	  prevailed,	  indigenous	  peoples	  were	  not	  recognized	  as	  a	  sovereign	  entity,	  
and	  as	  such	  were	  not	  able	  to	  exercise	  sovereign	  rights	  to	  natural	  resources.4	  	  
Throughout	   time,	   however,	   a	   new	   definition	   was	   born.	   Peoples	   were	   now	  
referred	   to	  as	   “groups	  united	  by	   common	  ethnicity	  and	  culture.”5	  With	   the	   creation	  of	  
the	   United	   Nations	   in	   1945,	   things	   started	   to	   improve	   concerning	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples.	   In	   1966,	   two	   major	   international	   human	   rights	   documents	   were	  
adopted,	   the	   international	   Covenant	   for	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	   (ICCPR)	   and	   the	  
International	   Covenant	   for	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   (ICESCR).	   Both	  
documents	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  ratification,	  and	  solidify	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  
the	  right	  to	  culture,	  and	  other	  important	  rights.	  In	  1989,	  things	  developed	  further,	  with	  
the	  adoption	  of	  ILO	  169,	  which	  established	  specific	  group	  rights	  for	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
From	   then	   onwards,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   been	   included	   in	   decision-­‐making	  
processes,	   awareness	   about	   indigenous	   peoples	   has	   been	   created,	   and	   now,	   with	   the	  
UNDRIP	  adopted	  in	  2007,	  there	  is	  an	  official	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  
peoples.	   It	   is	   evident	   that	   culture	   started	   playing	   an	   important	   role	   when	   defining	   a	  
people.	  There	  has	  thus	  been	  a	  “paradigm	  shift”	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  peoples,	  
as	  a	  people	  is	  no	  longer	  exclusively	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  passports,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  
of	   ethnic/cultural	   communalities,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   context	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.6	  The	  
recognition	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  culture,	  and	   its	  applicability	   to	   indigenous	  peoples,	   is	  
the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  the	  indigenous	  rights	  regime	  is	  based.	  	  
	   Still,	  there	  is	  no	  recent	  legally	  binding	  definition	  for	  indigenous	  peoples.	  UNDRIP	  
does	  not	  include	  a	  definition	  on	  indigenous	  peoples.	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  (soft)	  legal	  
guidance	   that	   is	  often	   referred	   to.	  First	  of	   all,	   José	  Martínez	  Cobo	  offered	  a	   statement,	  
which	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Cobo	  definition:	  	  
Indigenous	   communities,	   peoples	   and	   nations	   are	   those	   which,	   having	   a	   historical	  
continuity	   with	   pre-­‐invasion	   and	   pre-­‐colonial	   societies	   that	   developed	   on	   their	  
territories,	   consider	   themselves	   distinct	   from	   other	   sectors	   of	   the	   societies	   now	  
prevailing	   in	   those	   territories,	   or	   parts	   of	   them.	   They	   form	   at	   present	   non-­‐dominant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  S.	  James	  Anaya,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2004),	  27.	  
5	  Åhrén,	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Relevant	  to	  Natural	  Resource	  Extraction	  in	  
Indigenous	  Territories,”	  22.	  See	  also	  Anaya,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law,	  7;	  
49-­‐72.	  
6	  Mattias	  Åhrén,	  “Indigenous	  Peoples	  Rights,”	  seminar	  as	  part	  of	  the	  course	  Indigenous	  
Peoples	  Rights	  at	  UiT	  –	  The	  Arctic	  University	  of	  Norway	  (2nd	  March	  2015).	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sectors	   of	   society	   and	   are	   determined	   to	   preserve,	   develop	   and	   transmit	   to	   future	  
generations	   their	   ancestral	   territories,	   and	   their	   ethnic	   identity,	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   their	  
continued	   existence	   as	   peoples,	   in	   accordance	  with	   their	   own	   cultural	   patterns,	   social	  
institutions	  and	  legal	  systems.7	  
	  
This	  definition	  has	  now	  been	  used,	  for	  lack	  of	  a	  legally	  binding	  one,	  to	  define	  indigenous	  
peoples.	   A	   problem	   concerning	   the	   non-­‐dominant	   element	   of	   this	   definition	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   is	   that	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   Inuit	   in	   Greenland	   are	   not	   really	  
indigenous	  peoples	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  human	  rights,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  dominant	  group	  in	  their	  
country	   of	   Greenland.	   However,	   they	   are	   not	   the	   dominant	   group	   in	   the	   Kingdom	   of	  
Denmark.	   This	   issue	   could	   potentially	   threaten	   the	   Inuit’s	   indigenous	   hunting	  
opportunities.	  	  
The	   Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  Convention	  (ILO	  169),	  although	  not	  explicitly	  
defining	  indigenous	  peoples,	  provides	  that	  the	  Convention	  applies	  to	  	  
peoples	   in	   independent	  countries	  who	  are	  regarded	  as	   indigenous	  on	  account	  od	  their	  
descent	  from	  the	  populations	  which	   inhabited	  the	  country,	  or	  a	  geographical	  region	  to	  
which	  the	  country	  belongs,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conquest	  or	  colonisation	  or	  the	  establishment	  
of	  present	  state	  boundaries	  and	  who,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  legal	  status,	  retain	  some	  or	  all	  
of	  their	  own	  social,	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  political	  institutions.8	  	  
	  
Additionally,	   ILO	   169	   affirms	   that	   self-­‐identification	   as	   indigenous	   is	   a	   “fundamental	  
criterion”	  for	  determining	  the	  groups	  to	  which	  the	  Convention	  applies.9	  	  
Legal	  scholars	  have	  also	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
According	  to	  S.	  James	  Anaya,	  a	  highly	  recognized	  legal	  scholar	  in	  the	  field	  of	  indigenous	  
studies,	   the	   term	   indigenous	   “refers	   broadly	   to	   the	   living	   descendants	   of	   preinvasion	  
habitants	  of	   lands	  now	  dominated	  by	  others,”	   and	  he	  adds	   that	   “[i]ndigenous	  peoples,	  
nations,	  or	  communities	  are	  culturally	  distinctive	  groups	  that	  find	  themselves	  engulfed	  
by	  settler	  societies	  born	  of	  the	  forces	  of	  empire	  and	  conquest.”10	  The	  four	  main	  elements	  
within	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  thus	  are:	  self-­‐identification,	  distinctiveness,	  non-­‐
dominant,	  and	  a	  connection	  to	  a	  territory,	  whilst	  retaining	  their	  own	  societal	  structure.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  José	  Martínez	  Cobo,	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Prevention	  of	  
Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities,	  Study	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  Discrimination	  
against	  Indigenous	  Populations	  (1986),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4,	  para.	  
379.	  
8	  C169	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  Convention	  (No.	  169)	  (1989),	  Article	  1(1)(b).	  
9	  Ibid.,	  Article	  1(2).	  
10	  Anaya,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law,	  3.	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1.2	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  and	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  
There	  is	  less	  discourse	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  within	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  or	  
international	  environmental	  law.	  The	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention,	  for	  example,	  makes	  no	  
mention	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   However,	   the	   International	   Whaling	   Commission	   has	  
examined	  how	  to	  define	  indigenous	  peoples,	  noting	  that	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  
is	  whaling	  carried	  out	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  “aboriginal,	  indigenous	  or	  native	  peoples	  who	  
share	   strong	   community,	   familial,	   social	   and	   cultural	   ties	   related	   to	   a	   continuing	  
traditional	   dependence	   on	   whaling	   and	   on	   the	   use	   of	   whales.”11	  This	   definition	   thus	  
relies	   on	   community,	   familial,	   social	   and	   cultural	   ties	   to	   an	   historical	   and	   present	  
reliance	  on	  whaling.	  	  
The	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement	   refers	   to	   “local	   people	   using	   traditional	   methods,”	  
emphasizing	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   historical	   and	   present	   ties	   to	   the	   tradition.12	  
Additionally,	  even	  though	  the	  word	  “indigenous”	  is	  not	  used,	  the	  term	  “local	  people”	  still	  
affirms	  the	   importance	  of	   the	   land	  and	  natural	  resources.	  Comparing	   this	  definition	   to	  
that	  used	  within	  human	  rights	  law,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  within	  law	  of	  the	  sea,	  there	  is	  
more	   emphasis	   on	   distinctiveness	   and	   the	   special	   connection	   to	   the	   land	   and	   natural	  
resources,	  with	  their	  own	  societal	  structure.	  The	  other	  two	  elements	  referred	  to	  within	  
human	   rights	   law,	   self-­‐identification	   and	   the	   relational	   elements,	   are	   less	   important	  
within	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea.	  	  
1.3	  Distinction	  between	  Minorities	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
As	   will	   be	   explained	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis,	   Article	   27	   of	   the	   ICCPR	  
establishes	  rights	  for	  minorities.	  Although	  the	  provision	  applies	  explicitly	  to	  members	  of	  
a	   minority,	   it	   is	   also	   applicable	   to	   members	   of	   an	   indigenous	   group.	   However,	  
indigenous	  rights	  are	  not	  directly	  applicable	  to	  other	  minority	  groups.	  There	  are	  many	  
minorities,	  such	  as	  the	  Basques	  or	  the	  Kurds,	  who	  in	  no	  case	  would	  identify	  themselves	  
as	  indigenous	  peoples,	  whereas	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  regime	  would	  offer	  them	  more	  
extensive	   and	   autonomous	   rights.	   The	   distinction	   between	  minorities	   and	   indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  G.P.	  Donovan,	  “The	  International	  Whaling	  Commission	  and	  Aboriginal/Subsistence	  
Whaling:	  April	  1979	  to	  July	  1981,”	  in	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  
“Aboriginal/Subsistence	  Whaling	  (with	  Special	  Reference	  to	  the	  Alaska	  and	  Greenland	  
Fisheries),	  Special	  Issue	  4	  (1982),	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=464&k=dd5e19effe	  
(accessed	  20	  July	  2015),	  79;	  83.	  
12	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  (1973),	  Article	  III(1)(d).	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peoples,	   and	   the	   justifications	   for	   their	   differing	   rights,	   helps	   to	   clarify	   the	   distinctive	  
elements	  of	  a	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
When	   one	   compares	   the	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	   Belonging	   to	  
National	   or	  Ethnic,	  Religious	   and	  Lingquistic	  Minorites	   (the	  Minorities	  Declaration)	   to	  
UNDRIP,	   it	   follows	   that	   UNDRIP	   provides	   a	   more	   extensive	   set	   of	   rights.	   But	   if	   the	  
criteria	   of	   belonging	   to	   a	   minority	   group	   and	   an	   indigenous	   group	   are	   quite	   similar,	  
what,	  then,	  explains	  the	  difference?	  In	  2000,	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  issued	  a	  
working	   paper	   on	   the	   relationship	   and	   distinction	   between	   the	   rights	   of	   persons	  
belonging	   to	   minorities	   and	   those	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   It	   consisted	   of	   a	   paper	   by	  
Asbjørn	  Eide,	  an	  expert	  on	  minorities,	  and	  Erica-­‐Irene	  Daes,	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples.	  Mr	  Eide’s	  paper	  discussed	  how	  the	  Minorities	  Declaration	  “aim[s]	  at	  
ensuring	  a	  space	  for	  pluralism	  in	  togetherness,”	  whereas	  the	  instruments	  concerning	  the	  
rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  –	  UNDRIP	  was	  still	  in	  its	  draft	  stage	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  paper	  
–	   “are	   intended	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   autonomous	   development.” 13 	  The	  
Minorities	   Declaration,	   taking	   an	   integrationist	   approach,	   thus	   focuses	   on	   effective	  
participation	   in	   the	   larger	   society	   (as	   shown	   by	   Articles	   2(2)	   and	   2(3)),	   whereas	   the	  
draft	  UNDRIP	  and	  ILO	  169	  allocate	  authority	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  
their	  own	  decisions,	  included	  in	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  (as	  illustrated	  by	  Articles	  
7	  and	  8	  of	  ILO	  169,	  and	  Articles	  4,	  23	  and	  31	  of	  the	  draft	  indigenous	  declaration).14	  This	  
observation	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  final	  form	  of	  UNDRIP	  (as	  reflected	  in	  Article	  3,	  4,	  and	  5).	  
Another	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  Declarations	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  recognition	  of	  rights	  
of	  minorities	   concerning	   lands	   and	   natural	   resources.	   One	   can	   thus	   conclude	   that	   the	  
connection	  to	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources	  is	  a	  defining	  difference	  between	  the	  identity	  
of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  those	  of	  other	  minorities.	  A	  third	  clear	  distinction	  is	  that	  the	  
rights	  of	  minorities	  inhere	  in	  individuals,	  whereas	  indigenous	  rights	  refer	  to	  peoples	  or	  
groups.15	  Article	   27	   of	   the	   ICCPR,	   for	   example,	   applies	   to	   “persons	   belonging	   to	   such	  
minorities,”	  rather	  than	  the	  minority	  as	  a	  collective.16	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  –	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  the	  Promotion	  
and	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  “Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  and	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Minorities:	  Working	  paper	  on	  the	  relationship	  and	  distinction	  between	  the	  
rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities	  and	  those	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,”	  (2000),	  UN	  
Doc.	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10,	  para.	  8.	  
14	  Ibid.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  para.	  9.	  
16	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (1966),	  Article	  27.	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Mr.	  Eide	  concludes	  that	  what	  is	  normally	  held	  to	  distinguish	  indigenous	  peoples	  
from	   other	   groups	   is	   “their	   prior	   settlement	   in	   the	   territory	   in	   which	   they	   live,”	  
combined	  with	  “their	  maintenance	  of	  a	  separate	  culture	  which	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  their	  
particular	   ways	   of	   using	   land	   and	   natural	   resources.” 17 	  Indigenous	   peoples	   are	  
distinguished	   from	   other	   minorities	   because	   of	   their	   historical	   pre-­‐colonial	   presence,	  
claim	  and	  traditions	  to	  their	  land	  and	  resources,	  their	  will	  to	  stay	  relatively	  autonomous,	  
and	  their	  tradition	  of	  group	  life.	  
1.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
By	  comparing	  the	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  minorities,	  and	  by	  
comparing	  the	  human	  rights	  definition	  to	  the	  definition	  used	  by	  the	  ICRW	  and	  the	  Polar	  
Bear	  Agreement,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  extract	  the	  common	  elements	  to	  a	  general	  definition	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples.	   In	  this	   thesis,	   the	  strict	   formalities	  regarding	  the	  definition	  do	  not	  
matter	   as	   much.	   Neither	   the	   IWC,	   nor	   the	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement	   have	   a	   very	   strict	  
definition	  with	  explicit	  stipulated	  criteria,	  but	  rather	  assume	  a	  group	  is	  indigenous,	  and	  
then	  check	  whether	  that	  group	  could	  qualify	  for	  indigenous	  hunting	  rights.	  The	  existing	  
regimes	   focus	   more	   on	   defining	   the	   criteria	   for	   the	   activity	   (hunting),	   rather	   than	  
defining	   the	   groups	   who	   are	   eligible	   to	   perform	   that	   activity.	   For	   now,	   the	   most	  
important	  elements	  for	  defining	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  a	  special	  
relationship	  with	  their	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  a	  distinct	  societal	  
structure	  and	  culture,	  both	  dating	  from	  pre-­‐colonial	  periods.	  	  
In	   the	   future,	   however,	   it	   might	   be	   useful	   for	   the	   IWC	   and	   the	   Polar	   Bear	  
Agreement	   to	   have	   an	   agreed	   definition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   with	   a	   clear	   set	   of	  
criteria,	  as	  it	  would	  make	  the	  granting	  of	  indigenous	  quotas	  a	  lot	  easier.	  It	  is	  likely	  that,	  
after	  a	  UN	  declaration	  on	  indigenous	  peoples,	  there	  might,	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  also	  be	  a	  
binding	  convention	  on	  indigenous	  peoples,	  with	  presumably	  a	  definition.	  This	  definition	  
could	   then	   possibly	   be	   used	   for	   designating	   indigenous	   hunting	   rights.	   For	   now,	  
however,	   it	   is	  up	  to	  the	  IWC	  to	  decide	  whether	  an	  indigenous	  group	  can	  qualify	   for	  an	  
aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  quota.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  ”Working	  paper	  on	  the	  relationship	  
and	  distinction	  between	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities	  and	  those	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples,”	  para.	  24.	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2	   The	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   to	   Harvest	   Marine	   Mammals	  
from	  a	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Perspective	  
	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  investigate	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals,	  
from	   the	   perspective	   of	   human	   rights	   law,	   and	   from	   that	   of	   law	   of	   the	   sea	   and	  
environmental	  law.	  This	  section	  will	  analyse	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  harvest	  
marine	   mammals	   as	   recognised	   in	   human	   rights	   law,	   primarily	   focusing	   on	   the	  
International	  Covenant	  for	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  
the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  and	  relevant	  case	  law	  and	  reports.	  
2.1	  The	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐Determination	  
The	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  enshrined	  in	  both	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  the	  ICESCR.	  UNDRIP	  
has	  also	  affirmed	  this	  right.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  relevant	  provisions,	  after	  which	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  will	  be	  discussed	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  harvest	  
of	  marine	  mammals	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
Common	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  the	  ICESCR	  states	  that	  “[a]ll	  peoples	  have	  the	  
right	   to	   self-­‐determination.”18	  Subparagraph	   2	   of	   Article	   1	   provides	   that	   “[i]n	   no	   case	  
may	  a	  people	  be	  deprived	  of	  its	  own	  means	  of	  subsistence.”19	  This	  latter	  element	  is	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  economic	  element	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  Self-­‐determination	  is	  widely	  
known	  to	  be	  a	  norm	  of	  customary	  international	  law,	  and	  even	  jus	  cogens.20	  For	  a	  while,	  
it	  was	  never	  clear	  whether	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  applied	  to	  indigenous	  people,	  because	  
the	  traditional	  human	  rights	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  was	  still	  used.	  Many	  states	  
were	  afraid	  that	  if	  Article	  1	  were	  applicable	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  it	  would	  allow	  them	  
the	  right	   to	   secede.	  However,	  Article	  3	  of	  UNDRIP	  has	  now	  confirmed	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   although	  Article	   46(1)	   provides	   that	   the	  
scope	   of	   this	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   the	   right	   to	   secede.21	  The	  
Human	   Rights	   Committee	   has	   also	   confirmed	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Article	  1(1);	  International	  
Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966),	  Article	  1(1).	  
19	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Article	  1(2);	  International	  
Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  Article	  1(2).	  
20	  Anaya,	  “Self-­‐Determination:	  A	  Foundational	  Principle,”	  in	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  
International	  Law,	  97.	  
21	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (2007),	  Article	  3;	  
Article	  46(1).	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determination	   to	   indigenous	   peoples,	   as	   it	   has	   applied	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	  
numerous	  times	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  its	  country	  reports.22	  Article	  4	  of	  UNDRIP	  goes	  
a	  bit	   further,	  by	  stating	   that	   the	  right	   to	  self-­‐determination	  also	  consists	  of	  having	   the	  
right	   to	   “autonomy	   or	   self-­‐government	   in	  matters	   relating	   to	   their	   internal	   and	   local	  
affairs.”23	  Finally,	  Article	  20	  of	  UNDRIP	  states	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
“be	  secure	  in	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  own	  means	  of	  subsistence	  and	  development,	  and	  to	  
engage	   freely	   in	   all	   their	   traditional	   and	   other	   economic	   activities,”	   which	   expands	  
Article	  1(2)	  of	  the	  ICCPR.24	  
Although	  UNDRIP	  is	  a	  declaration	  and	  not	  a	  legally	  binding	  treaty,	  some	  elements	  
of	   the	  Declaration	  do	   represent	   customary	   international	   law	  and	   in	   this	   case	  Article	  3	  
represents	  an	  authoritative	  statement	  by	  most	  states	  that	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  
extends	   on	   a	   non-­‐discriminary	   basis	   to	   indigenous	   peoples,	   and	   brings	   indigenous	  
peoples	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  common	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  the	  ICESCR.	  Therefore,	  
we	   can	   agree	  with	  Mattias	   Åhrens	   that	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   as	   reflected	   in	  
UNDRIP	  is	  indicative	  of	  customary	  international	  law.25	  
S.	   James	   Anaya	   claims	   that	   self-­‐determination,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   right	   to	   form	  
one’s	   own	   state,	   means	   “that	   peoples	   are	   entitled	   to	   participate	   equally	   in	   the	  
constitution	  and	  development	  of	  the	  governing	  institutional	  order	  under	  which	  they	  live	  
and,	   further,	   to	  have	   that	  governing	  order	  be	  one	   in	  which	   they	  may	   live	  and	  develop	  
freely	  on	  a	  continuous	  basis.”26	  It	  is	  thus	  based	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  
In	  an	  article	  about	  the	  Makah	  Indian	  tribe’s	  exercise	  of	  cultural	  self-­‐determination	  and	  
the	   practice	   of	   whaling,	   Miller	   defines	   cultural	   self-­‐determination	   as	   “the	   right	   of	   a	  
distinct	  and	  identifiable	  group	  of	  people	  or	  a	  separate	  political	  state	  to	  set	  the	  standards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  See	  for	  example	  CCPR/C/79/Add.105;	  A/55/40;	  CCPR/CO/74/SWE;	  
CCPR/C/79/Add.109;	  CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5;	  CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5;	  CCPR/C/79/Add.112;	  
CCPR/CO/82/FIN;	  CCPR/CO/75/NZL.	  
23	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  Article	  4.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  Article	  20(1).	  
25	  Åhren,	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Relevant	  to	  Natural	  Resource	  Extraction	  in	  
Indigenous	  Territories,”	  33-­‐34.	  
26	  S.	  James	  Anaya,	  “The	  Right	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  to	  Self-­‐Determination	  in	  the	  Post-­‐
Declaration	  Era,”	  in	  Claire	  Charters	  and	  Rodolfo	  Stavenhagen,	  Making	  the	  Declaration	  
Work:	  The	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (Copenhagen:	  
Eks-­‐Skolens	  Trykkeri,	  2009),	  189.	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and	  mores	  of	  what	  constitutes	  its	  traditional	  culture	  and	  how	  it	  will	  honour	  and	  practice	  
that	  culture.”27	  
The	  question	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  economic	  aspect	  of	  the	  right	  
to	   self-­‐determination	   to	   the	   harvest	   of	   marine	   mammals	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   is	  
whether	   the	  hunt	   for	  whales	  and	  polar	  bears	  can	  truly	  be	  viewed	  as	  subsistence.	  Only	  
then	   will	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   be	   applicable.	   To	   analyse	   what	   subsistence	  
entails,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   look	   at	   how	   the	   IWC	  has	  dealt	  with	   this	   question.	  Both	   regimes	  
require	  the	  whale	  hunt	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  subsistence	  purposes,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  of	  those	  
instances	  in	  which	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  and	  human	  rights	  law	  can	  be	  complementary	  to	  each	  
other.	  One	  should	  be	  cautious,	  however,	  because	  the	  same	  term	  used	  in	  different	  treaties	  
could	  have	  a	  different	  meaning,	  a	  point	  that	  the	  International	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  
Sea	  (ITLOS)	  has	  made	  in	  the	  MOX	  Plant	  Provisional	  Measures	  Order.28	  In	  any	  case,	  one	  
could	   argue,	   that	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   indigenous	   peoples	   should	   have	   the	   right	   to	  
participate	   on	   the	   international	   plane	   with	   regards	   to	   discussions	   about	   aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling	  quotas	  for	  example.	  	  
2.2	  The	  Right	  to	  Culture	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	  
culture.	  The	   right	   to	   culture	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	   ICCPR	  and	  UNDRIP.	  First,	   this	   section	  
will	  look	  at	  the	  relevant	  provision	  in	  the	  ICCPR,	  Article	  27.	  Then,	  the	  General	  Comment	  
by	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  (HRC),	  the	  treaty	  body	  of	  the	  ICCPR,	  will	  be	  analysed,	  
after	   which	   the	   analysis	   will	   end	   with	   relevant	   decisions	   by	   the	   HRC.	   Secondly,	   the	  
relevant	   provision	   in	   UNDRIP	   will	   be	   analysed.	   Both	   sections	   will	   offer	   a	   short	  
conclusion	   on	   whether	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   extends	   to	   the	   right	   to	   harvest	   marine	  
mammals	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
2.2.1	  Article	  27	  ICCPR	  
Article	  27	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  reads:	  
In	  those	  States	  in	  which	  ethnic,	  religious	  or	  linguistic	  minorities	  exist,	  persons	  belonging	  
to	  such	  minorities	  shall	  not	  be	  denied	  the	  right,	  in	  community	  with	  the	  other	  members	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Robert	  J.	  Miller,	  “Exercising	  Cultural	  Self-­‐Determination:	  The	  Makah	  Indian	  Tribe	  Goes	  
Whaling,”	  American	  Indian	  Law	  Review	  25	  (2000/2001),	  206.	  
28	  The	  Mox	  Plant	  Case	  (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Request for Provisional Measures: Order 
of 3 December 2001, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, para. 451.	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of	  their	  group,	  to	  enjoy	  their	  own	  culture,	  to	  profess	  and	  practise	  their	  own	  religion,	  or	  
to	  use	  their	  own	  language.29	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  reference	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  this	  provision,	   it	   is	  
still	   applicable	   to	   their	   situation,	   as	   they	   are	   by	   definition	   an	   ethnic,	   religious	   or	  
linguistic	  minority	  within	  the	  state,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  must	  
be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  an	  individual	  right.	  It	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  Peoples,	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  
groups,	  but	  only	  to	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  a	  minority	  group.	  This	  is	  often	  problematic	  
for	  indigenous	  peoples,	  as	  they	  identify	  themselves	  as	  a	  group,	  and	  argue	  for	  collective	  
rights.	  	  
	   The	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  issued	  General	  Comment	  No.	  23	  in	  1994,	  in	  which	  
it	  evaluates	  Article	  27,	  and	  provides	  some	  guidance	  for	  interpretation	  of	  the	  article.	  The	  
General	   Comment	   concludes	   that	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   is	   “directed	  
towards	  ensuring	  the	  survival	  and	  continued	  development	  of	  the	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  
social	   identity	   of	   the	   minorities	   concerned,	   thus	   enriching	   the	   fabric	   of	   society	   as	   a	  
whole.”30	  It	   thus	  puts	   the	   concept	  of	   culture	   in	   the	   context	  of	   religion	  and	   language.	   It	  
affirms	   that	   the	   right	   is	   an	   individual	   right,	   “conferred	   on	   individuals	   belonging	   to	  
minority	  groups,”	  and	  that	  the	  right	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  other	  individual	  rights	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  Covenant.31	  Accordingly,	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  
right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   is	   not	  
recognized	  under	  the	  first	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  ICCPR.32	  This	  means	  that	  individuals,	  
whose	  countries	  are	  state	  parties	  to	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  can	  submit	  a	  
claim	  of	  violations	  of	  their	  right	  to	  culture	  to	  the	  HRC.33	  This	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  the	  right	  
to	  self-­‐determination.	  
	   Following	   from	  the	  wording	  of	  Article	  27,	   the	  protection	   it	  offers	  seems	   limited	  
because	   the	   threshold	   for	   breach	   is	   high.	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	   phrase	   “shall	   not	   be	  
denied	   the	   right,”	  which	  means	   that	  only	   actions	   that	   completely	  deny	   the	   indigenous	  
peoples’	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  culture	  seem	  to	  be	  prohibited.	  However,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Article	  27.	  
30	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  CCPR	  General	  Comment	  No.	  23:	  Article	  27	  (Rights	  of	  
Minorities),	  8	  April	  1994,	  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5,	  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc0.html	  (accessed	  18	  August	  2015),	  para.	  9.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  para.	  1.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  para.	  3.1.	  
33	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (1966),	  
Article	  1;	  Article	  2.	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Committee	   in	   its	   General	   Comment	   stated	   that	   although	   it	   is	   expressed	   in	   negative	  
terms,	  Article	  27	  “does	  recognize	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   ‘right’,”	  and	   that	  states	  parties	  are	  
required	  to	  take	  positive	  measures	  “to	  ensure	  that	  the	  existence	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  
right	   are	   protected	   against	   their	   denial	   or	   violation.”34	  The	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	  
went	  even	  further,	  and	  argued	  that	  states	  may	  also	  need	  to	  take	  positive	  measures	  “to	  
protect	   the	   identity	   of	   a	  minority	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   its	  members	   to	   enjoy	   and	  develop	  
their	  culture	  […]	  in	  community	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group.”35	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  recognized	  that	  “to	  enjoy	  a	  particular	  
culture”	  may	  mean	  “a	  way	  of	  life	  which	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  territory	  and	  use	  of	  its	  
resources.”36	  It	   also	   observed	   that	   “culture	  manifests	   itself	   in	  many	   forms,	   including	   a	  
particular	  way	  of	  life	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  land	  resources,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples.”37	  At	  first	  sight,	  it	  might	  be	  difficult	  to	  bring	  the	  hunt	  of	  whales	  and	  
polar	   bears	   under	   “the	   use	   of	   land	   resources,”	   but	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   has	  
concluded	  that	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  “may	  include	  such	  traditional	  activities	  as	  fishing	  or	  
hunting.”38	  This	   way,	   according	   to	   the	   HRC,	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   thus	   extends	   to	   the	  
harvesting	  of	  whales	  and	  polar	  bears	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  	  
	   The	   decisions	   by	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   also	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   the	  
matter.	  Poma	  Poma	  v.	  Peru,	  for	  example,	  concerns	  a	  dispute	  over	  the	  allocation	  of	  water,	  
threatening	   the	   indigenous	   Aymara	   people’s	   means	   of	   subsistence.	   It	   established	   a	  
distinction	   between	   measures	   “whose	   impact	   amounts	   to	   a	   denial	   of	   the	   right	   of	   a	  
community	  to	  enjoy	  its	  own	  culture,”	  and	  “measures	  with	  only	  a	  limited	  impact	  on	  the	  
way	  of	  life	  and	  livelihood	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  that	  community,”	  of	  which	  the	  latter,	  
according	   to	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee,	  would	   not	   satisfy	   the	   threshold	   of	   Article	  
27. 39 	  Furthermore,	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   introduced	   the	   threshold	   of	   a	  
“substantive	   negative	   impact.”40	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   the	   Länsman	   cases,	   it	   was	  
provided	   that	   no	   proportionality	   test	   is	   allowed,	  meaning	   that	   to	   prove	   a	   violation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  General	  Comment	  No.	  23,	  para.	  6.1.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  para.	  6.2.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  para.	  3.2.	  
37	  Ibid.,	  para.	  7.	  
38	  Ibid.	  
39	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  Ángela	  Poma	  Poma	  v.	  Peru	  (27	  march	  2009),	  
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006,	  para.	  7.4.	  
40	  Ibid.,	  para.	  7.5.	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Article	  27,	  one	  would	  only	  have	  to	  establish	  that	  the,	  albeit	  quite	  high,	  threshold	  is	  met.41	  
The	  “substantive	  negative	   impact”	   thus	  does	  not	  have	   to	  be	  balanced	  against	  a	  gain	  of	  
the	  larger	  society	  for	  example.	  	  
The	  question	  remains	  whether	  the	  denial	  of	  harvesting	  marine	  mammals	  would	  
only	  be	  a	  “limited	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  of	  life,”	  or	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  a	  “denial	  of	  the	  right	  
of	   a	   community	   to	   enjoy	   its	   own	   culture.”	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Human	   Rights	  
Committee	   in	   its	   General	   Comment	   emphasized	   that	   culture	   can	   mean	   a	   way	   of	   life	  
which	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  resources,	  and	  recognized	  that	  those	  resources	  can	  
refer	  to	  fishing	  or	  hunting,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  polar	  bear	  or	  whale	  
hunt	   can	   constitute	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   as	   enshrined	   in	   Article	   27.	  
Conversely,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  in	  Article	  27	  provides	  that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  (cultural)	  right	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals.	  	  
2.2.2	  Articles	  8,	  11,	  12,	  25,	  26	  and	  34	  UNDRIP	  
UNDRIP	   expands	   the	   right	   to	   culture,	   and	   makes	   it	   directly	   applicable	   to	   indigenous	  
peoples.	  First	  of	  all,	  Article	  8	  generally	  states	  that	  “[i]ndigenous	  peoples	  and	  individuals	  
have	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	   subjected	   to	   forced	   assimilation	   or	   destruction	   of	   their	  
culture.”42	  It	   then	   elaborates	   this	   general	   claim,	   and	   includes	   two	   provisions	   which	  
might	   be	   of	   use	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   harvest	   of	  marine	  mammals.	   Paragraph	   2(a)	   and	  
2(b)	   assert	   that	   the	   state	   shall	   “provide	   effective	   mechanisms	   for	   prevention	   of,	   and	  
redress	   for	   […]	   [a]ny	   action	   which	   has	   the	   aim	   or	   effect	   of	   depriving	   them	   of	   their	  
integrity	  as	  distinct	  peoples,	  or	  of	  their	  cultural	  values	  or	  ethnic	   identities,”	  and	  “[a]ny	  
action	  which	   has	   the	   aim	   or	   effect	   of	   dispossessing	   them	  of	   their	   lands,	   territories	   or	  
resources.”43	  Of	   course,	   the	   latter	   could	   seem	   problematic,	   as	   it	   might	   be	   difficult	   to	  
argue	  that	  whales,	  which	  will	  either	  be	  in	  the	  state’s	  territorial	  sea	  or	  EEZ,	  would	  qualify	  
as	  “their	  resources.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  less	  literal	  interpretation	  would	  conclude	  that	  
the	   provision	   also	   applies	   to	   denial	   of	   access	   to	   resources	  which	   they	  might	   have	   the	  
right	  to	  harvest.	  In	  any	  case,	  paragraph	  1	  still	  stands	  as	  a	  general	  provision.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  
decide	  on	  this	  question	  of	  interpretation,	  one	  must	  look	  at	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  This	  is	  contrast	  to	  the	  right	  to	  property,	  where	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  proportionality	  test.	  
UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  Illmari	  Länsman	  et	  al	  v.	  Finland	  (26	  October	  1994),	  
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992	  and	  Jouni	  E.	  Länsman	  et	  al	  v.	  Finland	  (30	  October	  1996),	  
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995.	  	  
42	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  Article	  8(1).	  
43	  Ibid.,	  Article	  8(2)(a);	  Article	  8(2)(b).	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Law	  of	   Treaties	   (VCLT).	   According	   to	   the	  VCLT,	   a	   provision	   should	   be	   interpreted	   ”in	  
good	   faith	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   ordinary	   meaning	   to	   be	   given	   to	   the	   terms	   of	   the	  
treaty	   in	   their	  context	  and	   in	   the	   light	  of	   its	  object	  and	  purpose.”44	  Although	  each	  case	  
should	  be	  weighed	  by	  its	  own	  merit,	  in	  this	  particular	  scenario,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  
provision	  also	  applies	  to	  denial	  of	  access	  to	  resources	  which	  they	  might	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
harvest.	  
Article	   11	   of	   UNDRIP	   affirms	   the	   right	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   “practice	   and	  
revitalize	  their	  cultural	  traditions	  and	  customs,”	  including	  the	  right	  to	  “maintain,	  protect	  
and	   develop	   the	   past,	   present	   and	   future	   manifestations	   of	   their	   cultures,	   such	   as	  
archaeological	   and	   historical	   sites,	   artefacts,	   designs,	   ceremonies,	   technologies	   and	  
visual	   and	   performing	   arts	   and	   literature.”45	  Additionally,	   Article	   12	   provides	   that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  	  
	  
manifest,	   practise,	   develop	   and	   teach	   their	   spiritual	   and	   religious	   traditions,	   customs	   and	  
ceremonies;	  the	  right	  to	  maintain,	  protect,	  and	  have	  access	  in	  privacy	  to	  their	  religious	  and	  
cultural	  sites;	  the	  right	  to	  the	  use	  and	  control	  of	  their	  ceremonial	  object;	  and	  the	  right	  to	  the	  
repatriation	  of	  their	  human	  remains.46	  
	  
Relatively	   clearly,	   the	   first	   sentence	   of	   Article	   11	   is	   very	   applicable	   to	   the	   harvest	   of	  
marine	   mammals.	   The	   remainder	   of	   the	   text	   offers	   examples	   and	   cannot	   be	   read	   as	  
excluding	   the	   harvest	   of	   marine	   mammals	   by	   indigenous	   peoples.	   Article	   12,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  is	  more	  specific.	  It	  offers	  an	  exhaustive	  list,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  more	  questionable	  
whether	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  and	  the	   indigenous	  polar	  bear	  hunt	  would	   fall	  
under	  “spiritual	  and	  religious	  traditions,	  customs	  and	  ceremonies.”	  
	   Article	  25	  and	  Article	  26(1)	  of	  UNDRIP	  are	  the	  main	  provisions	  for	  cultural	  rights	  
over	  land	  and	  land	  resources.	  Article	  25	  states	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
“maintain	  and	  strengthen	  their	  distinctive	  spiritual	  relationship	  with	  their	  traditionally	  
owned	  or	  otherwise	  occupied	  and	  used	   lands,	   territories,	  waters	  and	  coastal	   seas	  and	  
other	  resources.”47	  Obviously,	  the	  “other	  resources”	  phrase	  would	  be	  applicable	  to	  polar	  
bears	   and	  whales.	   However,	   because	   of	   the	  wording	   of	   this	   article,	   it	   is	   quite	   unclear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (1969),	  Article	  31(1).	  
45	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  Article	  11(1).	  
46	  Ibid.,	  Article	  12(1).	  
47	  Ibid.,	  Article	  25.	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whether	   these	   “other	   resources”	   should	   also	   be	   “traditionally	   owned	   or	   otherwise	  
occupied	   and	   used,”	   or	   whether	   that	   latter	   phrase	   only	   applies	   to	   lands,	   territories,	  
waters	   and	   coastal	   seas.	   In	   the	   first	   scenario,	   indigenous	   people	  would	   have	   to	   prove	  
that	  the	  hunt	  of	  whales	  and	  polar	  bears	  constitutes	  a	  tradition.	  	  
Article	   26(1)	   affirms	   that	   “[i]ndigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   the	   lands,	  
territories	   and	   resources	  which	   they	   have	   traditionally	   owned,	   occupied	   or	   otherwise	  
used	   or	   acquired.”48	  Paragraph	   3	   states	   that	   states	   shall	   “give	   legal	   recognition	   and	  
protection	  to	  these	  […]	  resources,”	  which	  shall	  be	  conducted	  “with	  due	  respect”	   to	  the	  
customs	   and	   traditions	   of	   the	   indigenous	   peoples. 49 	  This	   provision	   is	   said	   to	   be	  
customary	  international	  law.50	  Thus,	  it	  constitutes	  a	  legally	  binding	  obligation	  on	  states	  
to	  give	  legal	  recognition	  and	  protection	  to	  the	  resources.	  Of	  course,	  this	  provision	  could	  
still	  be	  ruled	   inapplicable	   to	   the	  harvest	  of	  marine	  mammals	  by	   indigenous	  peoples,	   if	  
one	  were	  not	  able	  to	  prove	  that	  marine	  mammals	  qualify	  as	  “resources	  which	  they	  have	  
traditionally	  […]	  used	  or	  acquired.”	  
Article	   34	   of	   UNDRIP,	   although	   not	   necessarily	   reflecting	   a	   general	   right	   to	  
culture,	   provides	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   “promote,	   develop	   and	  
maintain”	   their	   “distinctive	   customs,	   spirituality,	   traditions,	   procedures,	   [and]	  
practices,”	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	   in	   accordance	   with	   international	   human	   rights	  
standards.51	  Arguably,	  indigenous	  whaling	  and	  the	  polar	  bear	  hunt	  constitute	  distinctive	  
custom,	  traditions	  or	  practices,	  and	  so	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  maintain	  the	  
custom	  of	  harvesting	  marine	  mammals.	  The	  customs,	  traditions	  and	  practices	  must	  be	  in	  
accordance	  with	   international	   human	   rights	   standards.	   If	   it	  were	   to	   say	   ‘international	  
law’	   rather	   than	   “international	   human	   rights	   standards,”	   it	  might	   cause	   a	   problem,	   as	  
one	  would	  then	  have	  to	  balance	  this	  right	  against	  a	  state’s	  duty	  to	  protect	  and	  preserve	  
the	  marine	  environment.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  only	  states	  “international	  
human	   rights	   standards,”	   the	   provision	   declares	   a	   right	   to	   maintain	   the	   tradition	   of	  
whaling	  and	  hunting	  for	  polar	  bears.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Ibid.,	  Article	  26(1).	  
49	  Ibid.,	  Article	  26(3).	  
50	  Siegfried	  Wiessner,	  ”The	  Cultural	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Achievements	  and	  
Continuing	  Challenges,”	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  22	  no.	  1	  (2011),	  
137.	  
51	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  Article	  34.	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As	  previously	  mentioned,	  UNDRIP	  is	  merely	  a	  declaration	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  
Nations	   General	   Assembly,	   and	   as	   such	   does	   not	   have	   any	   legally	   binding	   authority.	  
However,	  this	  thesis	  has	  already	  argued	  that	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  applies	  in	  a	  
non-­‐discriminatory	   way	   to	   indigenous	   peoples.	   In	   essence,	   “the	   Declaration	   may	   be	  
understood	  to	  embody	  or	  reflect,	   to	  some	  extent,	  customary	  international	   law.”52	  In	  an	  
article	   on	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   the	   Declaration,	   Anaya	   and	   Wiessner	   conclude	   that	   the	  
provisions	  related	  to	  culture	  and	  tradition	  are	  indicative	  of	  customary	  international	  law.	  
In	   a	   survey	  of	   state	   and	   international	  practice	   they	  undertook	   in	  1999,	   it	  was	  already	  
affirmed	   that	   “indigenous	   peoples	   are	   entitled	   to	  maintain	   and	   develop	   their	   distinct	  
cultural	   identity,	   their	   spirituality,	   their	   language,	   and	   their	   traditional	  ways	   of	   life.”53	  
According	   to	  Anaya	  and	  Wiessner,	   state	  practice	   in	   the	  states	   that	  have	  an	   indigenous	  
population	   “largely	   conforms	   to	   these	   legal	   tenets.”54	  Furthermore,	   the	   International	  
Law	  Association,	  in	  a	  report	  from	  2010,	  concluded	  that	  rules	  of	  customary	  law	  related	  to	  
the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   a	   reality,	   and	   that	   these	   rules	   of	   customary	   law	  
correspond	   to,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   right	   to	   recognition	   and	   preservation	   of	   their	   cultural	  
identity	  and	  the	  right	  to	  their	  traditional	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources.55	  
To	   conclude,	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   does	   indeed	   extend	   to	   the	   harvest	   of	   marine	  
mammals	  by	  indigenous	  peoples,	  and	  that,	  arguably,	  that	  right	  is	  reflected	  in	  customary	  
international	  law.	  Article	  11	  and	  12	  of	  UNDRIP	  provide	  a	  general	  right	  to	  culture,	  which	  
by	   itself	   can	   already	   be	   applicable	   to	   the	   harvest	   of	   marine	   mammals.	   In	   addition,	  
Articles	  25	  and	  26(1)	  extend	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  to	  the	  use	  of	  resources,	  which	  includes	  
the	  harvest	  of	  marine	  mammals.	  Furthermore,	  Article	  34	  provides	  for	  a	  specific	  right	  to	  
maintain	   distinctive	   customs,	   traditions	   and	   practices.	   Therefore,	   indigenous	   people	  
have	  a	  right	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals,	  through	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  as	  reflected	  in	  both	  
the	  ICCPR,	  Article	  27,	  and	  the	  relevant	  articles	  in	  UNDRIP.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  S.	  James	  Anaya,	  “The	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,”	  
International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (New	  York:	  Aspen	  Publishers,	  2009),	  
80.	  
53	  S.	  James	  Anaya	  &	  Siegfried	  Wiessner,	  “The	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  
Peoples:	  Towards	  Re-­‐empowerment,”	  in	  Anaya,	  International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
Indigenous	  Peoples,	  100.	  
54	  Ibid.	  
55	  International	  Law	  Association,	  "Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,"	  Interim	  Report,	  The	  
Hague	  Conference	  (2010),	  http://www.ila-­‐hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024	  
(accessed	  18	  August	  2015),	  51.	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3	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Rights	   to	   Harvest	  Marine	  Mammals	   from	   a	  
Law	  of	  the	  Sea/International	  Environmental	  Law	  Perspective	  
	  
Every	  discussion	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  starts	  with	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
Convention.	   Therefore,	   as	   this	   chapter	   illustrates	   the	   indigenous	   peoples’	   right	   to	  
harvest	  marine	  mammals	  from	  a	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  perspective,	  it	  will	  start	  by	  analysing	  the	  
relevant	   provisions	   of	   UNCLOS,	   namely	   Articles	   64,	   65	   and	   120.	   From	   then	   on,	   this	  
chapter	   will	   be	   split	   up	   according	   to	   species.	   First,	   it	   will	   look	   at	   the	   regulations	  
governing	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   regime	  under	   the	   International	  Whaling	  
Convention.	  Secondly,	  this	  chapter	  will	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement.	  There	  
are	  also	  two	  other	  Polar	  Bear	  agreements,	  one	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Russia	  with	  regards	  
to	   th	   Alaska-­‐Chukotka	   population,	   and	   the	   other	   between	   Greenland	   and	   Nunavut.56	  
There	   is	   also	   an	   agreement	   between	   the	   Inuvialuit	   of	   Canada	   and	   the	   Inupiat	   of	   the	  
United	   States.57	  Due	   to	   time	   and	   length	   restraints,	   however,	   this	   thesis	  will	   not	   cover	  
those	   (bilateral)	   agreements,	   although	   these	   agreements	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	  
indigenous	  hunting	  for	  subsistence	  or	  traditional	  purposes.	  
3.1	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention	  
The	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   Convention	   aims	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   different	   groups	   of	  
nations,	   coastal	   states,	   flag	   states,	   and	   arguably	   to	   some	   extent	   port	   states.	   The	  
Convention	  is	  a	  framework	  convention,	  and	  adopts	  both	  a	  zonal	  approach,	  as	  a	  thematic	  
approach.	  The	  first	  chapters	  of	  the	  convention	  take	  on	  the	  zonal	  approach	  and	  regulate	  
the	   rules	   applicable	   in	   the	   different	   maritime	   zones,	   such	   as	   the	   Exclusive	   Economic	  
Zone	  (EEZ)	  and	  the	  High	  Seas,	  whereas	  the	  last	  chapters	  take	  on	  the	  thematic	  approach	  
and	  deal	  with	  specific	  themes,	  such	  as	  marine	  scientific	  research,	  or	  the	  protection	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  on	  the	  conservation	  and	  management	  of	  the	  Alaska-­‐
Chukotka	  polar	  population	  	  (16	  October	  2000),	  
http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/US-­‐Russia.html	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2015);	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  the	  Government	  of	  
Nunavut,	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Greenland	  for	  the	  Conservation	  and	  Management	  of	  Polar	  
Bear	  Populations	  (30	  October	  2009),	  	  http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/docs/GN-­‐MOU-­‐PB.pdf	  
(accessed	  19	  August	  2015).	  
57	  Inuvialuit	  -­‐	  Inupiat	  Polar	  Bear	  Management	  Agreement	  in	  the	  Southern	  Beaufort	  Sea	  (4	  
March	  2000),	  http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/USA-­‐Canada.html	  (accessed	  19	  
August	  2015).	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preservation	  of	   the	  marine	  environment.	   	  The	  Law	  of	   the	  Sea	  Convention	   is	  a	  package	  
deal,	  referring	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  compromises	  were	  made.	  Therefore,	  no	  reservations	  are	  
allowed.58 	  LOSC	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   rights	   and	   duties	   of	   states	   as	   subjects	   of	  
international	  law	  and	  as	  such	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  internal	  matters	  such	  as	  the	  duty	  of	  a	  
state	   to	   permit	   the	   harvest	   of	  marine	  mammals	   by	   indigenous	   peoples.	   It	   is	   thus	   not	  
surprising	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  not	  mentioned	  at	  all	  in	  the	  text.	  With	  that	  said,	  it	  
must	  be	  noted	  that,	  although	  LOSC	  is	  a	  very	  extensive	  treaty,	  it	  never	  aimed	  to	  regulate	  
everything	  related	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea.59	  	  
Part	  V	  sets	  out	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  states	  in	  the	  EEZ.	  The	  EEZ,	  a	  relatively	  new	  
concept	  within	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea,	  confers	  upon	  coastal	  states	  sovereign	  rights	  “for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  exploring	  and	  exploiting,	  conserving	  and	  managing	  the	  [living	  or	  non-­‐living]	  
natural	  resources”	  of	  the	  water	  column,	  seabed	  and	  subsoil	  to	  a	  distance	  of	  200	  nautical	  
miles.60	  It	   is	   a	   sui	   generis	   zone,	  with	   its	   own	   distinctive	   regime.61	  The	  majority	   of	   the	  
fisheries	   in	   the	   world	   reside	   within	   the	   200	   nautical	   miles,	   and	   so	   the	   EEZ	   regime’s	  
primary	  aim	  is	  to	  regulate	  the	  exploitation	  of	  marine	  living	  resources.62	  In	  that	  context,	  
Article	  61	  confers	  upon	  the	  coastal	  state	  the	  duty	  to	  conserve	  marine	  living	  resources	  by	  
establishing	   the	   total	   allowable	   catch	   and	   the	   maximum	   sustainable	   yield. 63	  
Furthermore,	   Article	   62	   provides	   that	   coastal	   states	   shall	   “promote	   the	   objective	   of	  
optimum	  utilization.”64	  	  
LOSC	  contains	   two	  short	  provisions	  with	  regards	   to	   the	  conservation	  of	  marine	  
mammals.	   Article	   64,	   the	   provision	   on	   highly	   migratory	   species,	   provides	   that	   States	  
which	   fish	   for	   highly	  migratory	   species	   in	   the	   region	   have	   to	   cooperate	   as	   to	   ensure	  
conservation	  and	  promote	  the	  objective	  of	  optimum	  utilization.65	  Because	  cetaceans	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (1982),	  Article	  309.	  
It	  is	  sometimes	  argued	  that	  the	  “package	  deal”	  has	  been	  violated	  due	  to	  the	  allegation	  
that	  the	  Implementation	  Agreement	  relating	  to	  Deep-­‐Sea	  Mining	  not	  only	  implemented	  
Part	  XI,	  but	  in	  fact	  amended	  it.	  This,	  however,	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  another	  discussion.	  
59	  See	  for	  example	  the	  Preamble:	  “Affirming	  that	  matters	  not	  regulated	  by	  this	  
Convention	  continue	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  rules	  and	  principles	  of	  general	  international	  
law.”	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Preamble.	  
60	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Article	  56(1)(a).	  
61	  Donald	  R	  Rothwell	  and	  Tim	  Stephens,	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  
Publishing,	  2010),	  84.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  82.	  
63	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Article	  61.	  
64	  Ibid.,	  Article	  62(1).	  
65	  Ibid.,	  Article	  64(1).	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listed	  as	  highly	  migratory	  species	  under	  Annex	  I,	  this	  provision	  is	  thus	  also	  valid	  for	  the	  
conservation	  of	  cetaceans.	  	  
Article	  65	  is	  said	  to	  be	  a	  lex	  specialis	  for	  marine	  mammals.66	  It	  provides	  that	  	  
Nothing	   in	   this	   Part	   restricts	   the	   right	   of	   a	   coastal	   State	   or	   the	   competence	   of	   an	  
international	   organization,	   as	   appropriate,	   to	   prohibit,	   limit	   or	   regulate	   the	  
exploitation	  of	  marine	  mammals	  more	   strictly	   than	  provided	   for	   in	   this	  Part.	   States	  
shall	  cooperate	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  conservation	  of	  marine	  mammals	  and	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   cetaceans	   shall	   in	   particular	   work	   through	   the	   appropriate	   international	  
organizations	  for	  their	  conservation,	  management	  and	  study.67	  	  
	  
It	   can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  exemption	   from	  Part	  V,	  although	  paragraph	  2	  of	  Article	  64	  
confuses	   that	   idea,	   as	   it	   states	   that	   the	   provision	   on	   optimum	   utilization	   applies	   “in	  
addition	   to	   the	   other	   provisions	   of	   this	   Part.”68	  However,	   it	   is	   said	   that	   Article	   65	  
nonetheless	   “removes	   all	  marine	  mammals	   from	   the	   full	   application	   of	   Part	   V	   in	   that	  
optimum	  utilization	  is	  not	  required.”69	  Through	  Article	  120,	  Article	  65	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  
conservation	   and	   management	   of	   marine	   mammals	   in	   the	   high	   seas.	   It	   is,	   however,	  
disputed	  whether	  it	  also	  applies	  for	  the	  territorial	  sea.70	  
The	  precise	  meaning	  of	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  Article	  65	  is	  much	  debated.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  
is	   questioned	   whether	   states	   are	   allowed	   to	   exploit	   marine	   mammals	   without	  
cooperating	  with	  the	  “relevant	   international	  organizations,”	  and	  secondly,	  whether	  the	  
plural	  usage	  of	  “organizations”	  “undermines	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  IWC	  as	  the	  organization	  
with	   which	   states	   must	   work	   when	   dealing	   with	   cetaceans.”71	  A	   third	   comment	   with	  
regards	  to	  Article	  65	  is	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  “work	  through”	  the	  international	  organizations	  
needs	  clarification.72	  It	   is	  unclear	  whether	  to	  “work	  through”	  means	  that	  coastal	  States	  
should	  become	  a	  full	  member	  of	  the	  appropriate	  organization,	  or	  whether	  mere	  dialogue	  
would	  be	  sufficient.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  E.J.	  Molenaar,	  “Ecosystem-­‐Based	  Fisheries	  Management,	  Commercial	  Fisheries,	  
Marine	  Mammals	  and	  the	  2001	  Reykjavik	  Declaration	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  International	  
Law,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Law	  17	  (2002),	  586-­‐587.	  
67	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Article	  65.	  
68	  Ibid.,	  Article	  64(2).	  
69	  Patricia	  Birnie,	  Alan	  Boyle	  and	  Catherine	  Redgwell,	  International	  Law	  &	  the	  
Environment	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  724.	  
70	  Ibid.,	  724,	  footnote	  94.	  
71	  Nigel	  Bankes,	  “The	  Conservation	  and	  Utilization	  of	  Marine	  Mammals	  in	  the	  Arctic	  
Region,”	  in	  Erik	  J.	  Molenaar,	  Alex	  G.	  Oude	  Elferink	  and	  Donald	  R.	  Rothwell,	  The	  law	  of	  the	  
Sea	  and	  the	  Polar	  Regions:	  Interactions	  between	  Global	  and	  Regional	  Regimes	  (Leiden:	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013),	  300.	  
72	  Yoshifumi	  Tanaka,	  “Conservation	  of	  Marine	  Living	  Resources,”	  The	  International	  Law	  
of	  the	  Sea	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  229.	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The	  first	  and	  second	  questions,	  especially,	  are	  important.	  Canada	  withdrew	  from	  
the	  ICRW	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  moratorium	  was	  set	  in	  place,	  and	  granted	  indigenous	  hunting	  
rights	   to	   its	   indigenous	  population.	  Does	   this	  mean	   that	  Canada	  violated	   its	  obligation	  
under	   Article	   65	   of	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   Convention	   because	   it	   permits	   indigenous	  
whaling?	  Article	  65	  only	  provides	  that	  nothing	  in	  the	  provisions	  on	  the	  EEZ	  restricts	  the	  
rights	   of	   coastal	   states	   and	   international	   organizations	   to	   regulate	   the	   exploitation	   of	  
marine	  mammals	  more	  strictly.	  It	  only	  suggests	  that	  a	  coastal	  state	  does	  not	  have	  a	  duty	  
to	  ensure	  optimum	  utilization.	  The	  first	  part	  of	   the	  provision	   is	   thus	  not	  an	  obligation,	  
and	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  violated.	  However,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  Article	  65	  is,	   in	  fact,	  an	  
obligation.	  According	   to	  Nigel	  Bankes,	   a	   simple	   reading	  of	   the	  provision	  provides	   that	  
“coastal	  states	  cannot	  proceed	  unilaterally	  in	  the	  conservation,	  management	  or	  study	  of	  
cetaceans	   but	   must	   work	   through	   appropriate	   organizations.”73	  It	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	  
provision	   implicitly	   refers	   to	   the	   IWC,	   as	   it	   clearly	   sets	   apart	   the	   conservation,	  
management	  and	  study	  of	  cetaceans	  from	  other	  marine	  mammals.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  
plural	   form	  used,	  and	   the	  duty	  under	   the	  VCLT	  to	   interpret	   the	   treaty	  according	   to	   its	  
ordinary	  meaning,	  the	  provision	  as	  it	  now	  stands	  could	  also	  refer	  to	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  
Marine	  Mammal	  Commission	  (NAMMCO),	  or	  possible	  other	  organizations	  dealing	  with	  
the	  conservation	  of	  cetaceans.74	  Birnie	  suggests	  that	  the	  IWC	  has	  primacy,	  but	  explains	  
the	  argument	  that	  the	  plural	  reference	  is	  there	  to	  include	  fisheries	  organizations	  due	  to	  
the	   issue	  of	   incidental	   catch.75	  However,	   the	  United	  Nations	  Division	   for	  Ocean	  Affairs	  
and	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   (UNDOALOS)	   suggests	   that	   the	   FAO	   and	   UNEP	   are	   also	  
international	   organisations	   under	   Article	   65,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   IWC.76	  In	   that	   case,	  
Canada	  did	  not	  violate	  Article	  65,	  as	  it	  can	  still	  work	  through	  “appropriate	  international	  
organizations”	  for	  the	  conservation	  of	  whales.	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  even	  though	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention	  do	  not	  
prohibit	  the	  exploitation	  of	  marine	  mammals,	  nor	  do	  they	  include	  any	  provision	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Bankes,	  “The	  Conservation	  and	  Utilization	  of	  Marine	  Mammals	  in	  the	  Arctic	  Region,”	  
300.	  
74	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,	  Article	  31(1).	  
75	  P.	  Birnie,	  “UNCED	  and	  Marine	  Mammals,”	  Marine	  Policy	  17	  (1993),	  509.	  
76	  United	  Nations	  Division	  for	  Ocean	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
Bulletin	  31	  (1996),	  82;	  T.L.	  McDorman,	  “Canada	  and	  Whaling:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Article	  65	  
of	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention,”	  Ocean	  Development	  &	  International	  Law	  29	  (1998),	  
185.	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rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals,	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention	  
does	  provide	  an	  open	  door	  to	  the	  IWC	  and	  the	  ICRW,	  and	  to	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement.	  	  
3.2	  International	  Whaling	  Convention	  
The	  problem	  of	  overexploitation	  of	  whales	  was	  already	  present	  during	   the	   time	  of	   the	  
League	   of	   Nations. 77 	  States	   concluded	   the	   first	   multilateral	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  in	  1931.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  convention	  was	  not	  as	  successful	  as	  
hoped,	   and	   therefore,	   in	   1937,	   9	   states	   signed	   a	   new	   International	  Agreement	   for	   the	  
Regulation	  of	  Whaling.	  This	  Agreement	   included	  additional	   species	  and	  prohibited	   the	  
taking	   of	   female	  whales	   accompanied	   by	   calves.	   The	   current	   treaty,	   the	   International	  
Convention	   for	   the	   Regulation	   of	   Whaling,	   was	   concluded	   in	   1946.	   	   According	   to	   its	  
Preamble,	  it	  undertook	  to	  provide	  “for	  the	  proper	  conservation	  of	  whale	  stocks	  and	  thus	  
make	   possible	   the	   orderly	   development	   of	   the	   whaling	   industry.”78	  The	   Convention	  
established	   the	   International	  Whaling	  Commission	   (IWC),	  which	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  
regulatory	   measures.	   The	   IWC	   was	   initially	   a	   resource-­‐focussed	   body,	   “designed	   to	  
promote	   the	   continued	   hunting	   of	  whales”	   by	   ensuring	   that	   heavily	   depleted	   species,	  
such	   as	   the	   blue	   whale,	   were	   given	   an	   opportunity	   to	   overcome	   extinction.79	  Now,	  
however,	   the	   IWC	  has	   transformed	   from	  an	  economic,	   resource-­‐based	  body,	   to	  a	  body	  
primarily	   aimed	   at	   conservation.80	  Attached	   to	   the	   Convention	   is	   the	   Schedule,	   which	  
includes	  regulatory	  measures	  for	  the	  protection	  and	  conservation	  of	  whales,	  and	  can	  be	  
updated	  regularly.	  Through	  Article	  I(1)	  of	  the	  ICRW,	  the	  Schedule	  is	  “an	  integral	  part”	  of	  
the	  Convention,	  and	  is	  therefore	  also	  legally	  binding	  upon	  the	  parties.81	  	  
In	   1982,	   the	   IWC	   adopted	   a	   moratorium	   on	   commercial	   whaling	   on	   all	   whale	  
stocks	  from	  the	  1985/85	  whaling	  season.82	  This	  was	  possible	  because	  there	  was	  now	  a	  
majority	  of	  anti-­‐whaling	  states	  within	  the	  IWC,	  so	  that	  the	  Schedule	  could	  be	  amended.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Tanaka,	  “Conservation	  of	  Marine	  Living	  Resources,”	  230.	  
78	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (1946),	  Preamble.	  
79	  Rothwell	  and	  Stephens,	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  308.	  
80	  Ibid.;	  Alexander	  Gillespie,	  Whaling	  Diplomacy:	  Defining	  Issues	  in	  International	  
Environmental	  Law	  (Cheltenham,	  UK:	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  Limited,	  2005).	  
81	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling,	  Article	  I(1).	  Through	  Article	  
V(3),	  parties	  are	  allowed	  to	  make	  reservations	  to	  the	  amendments	  to	  the	  Schedule,	  so	  
that,	  for	  example,	  Norway	  was	  able	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  moratorium.	  
82	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  
Whaling,	  1946:	  Schedule	  (September	  2014),	  
https://archive.iwc.int/?r=3606&k=db23125011	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015),	  Rule	  10(e).	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Since	   then,	  whaling	   under	   the	   International	  Whaling	   Convention	   has	   been	   prohibited,	  
with	  two	  exceptions.	  These	  exceptions,	  by	  definition,	  need	  to	  be	  non-­‐commercial,	  so	  that	  
the	   moratorium	   does	   not	   apply.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   exceptions	   is	   scientific	   whaling,	   a	  
controversial	   issue	   as	   illustrated	   by	   the	   recent	   case	   before	   the	   ICJ.83 	  The	   second	  
exemption	  to	  the	  moratorium	  is	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling.84	  	  
	   The	   next	   section	   examines	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	  
exception,	   drawing	   from	   the	   predecessors	   of	   the	   ICRW	   and	   IWC	   reports.	   Then,	   this	  
section	   will	   go	   into	   more	   detail	   regarding	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   provision,	   focusing	  
especially	   on	   nutrition,	   subsistence,	   and	   culture.	   Some	   limitations	   with	   regards	   to	  
aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  
3.2.1	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  Provision	  
Aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  has	  been	  recognized	  by	  international	  treaty	  for	  over	  70	  
years	   “as	   in	   some	   ways	   being	   different	   and	   having	   a	   distinctive	   character,	   making	   it	  
susceptible	   to	   other	   controls	   than	   those	   on	   the	   larger-­‐scale	   commercial	   whaling	  
operation.”85	  Firestone	   and	   Lilley	   confirm	   that	   the	   ”international	   community	   has	   long	  
treated	  aboriginal	  hunting	  of	  marine	  mammals	  differently	  than	  commercial	  hunting.”86	  
As	   early	   as	   1911,	   there	   was	   already	   a	   distinction	   between	   commercial	   hunting	   and	  
aboriginal	  hunting,	  in	  the	  1911	  Fur	  Seal	  Treaty.	  The	  Treaty	  was	  not	  to	  apply	  to	  “Indians,	  
Ainos,	  Aleuts,	  or	  other	  aborigines”	  who	  hunted	  for	  seals	  in	  canoes.87	  	  
The	  1931	  Convention	  endorsed	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  special	  exception	  for	  aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling.	  Article	  3	  of	  that	  Convention	  stipulated	  that	  the	  Convention	  would	  
not	  apply	  to:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Whaling	  in	  the	  Antarctic	  (Australia	  v. Japan:	  New	  Zealand	  Intervening),	  Judgment	  of	  31	  
March	  2014,	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  http://www.icj-­‐
cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf	  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015).	  	  
84	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  
Whaling,	  1946:	  Schedule	  (September	  2014),	  Rule	  13.	  
85	  Ray	  Gambell,	  “International	  Management	  of	  Whales	  and	  Whaling:	  An	  Historical	  
Review	  of	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Commercial	  and	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  Arctic	  46,	  
no	  2	  (1993),	  102.	  
86	  Jeremy	  Firestone	  and	  Jonathan	  Lilley,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  and	  the	  Right	  
to	  Practice	  and	  Revitalize	  Cultural	  Traditions	  and	  Customs,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Wildlife	  Law	  &	  Policy	  8	  (2005),	  194.	  
87	  Convention	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  Russia	  and	  Japan	  for	  the	  
Preservation	  and	  Protection	  of	  Fur	  Seals	  (July	  7,	  1911)	  (no	  longer	  in	  force),	  Article	  IV	  in	  
Firestone	  and	  Lilley,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Practice	  and	  
Revitalize	  Cultural	  Traditions	  and	  Customs,”	  194.	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aborigines	   dwelling	   on	   the	   coasts	   of	   the	   territories	   of	   the	   High	   Contracting	   Parties	  
provided	  that:	  
(1)	  They	  only	  use	  canoes,	  pirogues	  or	  other	  exclusively	  native	  craft	  propelled	  by	  oars	  or	  
sails;	  
(2)	  They	  do	  not	  carry	  firearms;	  
(3)	  They	  are	  not	  in	  the	  employment	  of	  persons	  other	  than	  aborigines;	  
(4)	  They	  are	  not	  under	   contract	   to	  deliver	   the	  products	  of	   their	  whaling	   to	  any	   third	  
person.88	  
	  
The	  Whaling	  Agreement	  of	  1937	  did	  not	  include	  any	  provision	  on	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  
whaling.	  However,	   aboriginal	  whaling	   for	  bowheads	  nevertheless	   continued	   in	  Alaska,	  
and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent	   in	   Canada.89	  The	   1946	   International	   Whaling	   Convention	   also	  
failed	   to	   include	   the	  aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	  provision	  of	   the	  1931	  Convention.	  
However,	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Conference	  in	  Washington	  in	  1946,	  which	  adopted	  
the	   text	  of	   the	   treaty,	  supported	  the	   taking	  of	  gray	  whales	   in	   the	  Bering	  and	  Chukotsk	  
seas	   “when	   the	  meat	   and	  products	  of	   such	  whales	   are	   to	  be	  used	  exclusively	   for	   local	  
consumption	   by	   the	   aborigines	   of	   the	   Chukotsk	   and	   Korjaksk	   areas.” 90 	  Thus	   the	  
exemption	  appeared	   in	   the	   first	  Schedule	   to	   the	  1946	  Convention,	  which	  stated	   that	   it	  
was	  forbidden	  to	  take	  gray	  whales	  or	  right	  whales,	  “except	  when	  the	  meat	  and	  products	  
of	  such	  whales	  are	  to	  be	  used	  exclusively	  for	  local	  consumption	  by	  the	  aborigines.”91	  	  
In	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s,	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   was	   not	  
considered	   to	   be	   an	   important	   issue	   at	   the	   IWC.92	  Nevertheless,	   concerns	   regarding	  
aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   continued	   to	   arise,	   and	   so	   when	   the	   proposed	  
moratorium	   was	   debated,	   it	   was	   soon	   clear	   that	   it	   would	   not	   apply	   to	   indigenous	  
whaling.93	  However,	  there	  were	  some	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  “potentially	  unsustainable	  
nature”	  of	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling,	  and	  so	  a	  special	  working	  group	  was	  created	  to	  
examine	  the	  entire	  issue	  and	  propose	  a	  sustainable	  regime	  for	  aboriginal	  hunting.94	  The	  
working	   group	   was	   divided	   into	   three	   panels,	   consisting	   of	   specialists	   in	   cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (1931)	  reprinted	  in	  P.	  Birnie,	  The	  
International	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (New	  York:	  Oceana,	  1985),	  Article	  3.	  
89	  Gambell,	  “International	  Management	  of	  Whales	  and	  Whaling,”	  101-­‐102.	  
90	  Resolution	  10	  of	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Conference,	  Washington,	  1946,	  reprinted	  
in	  Birnie,	  The	  International	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling.	  
91	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  “Schedule”	  in	  Report	  of	  the	  Second	  Meeting	  (1950),	  
https://archive.iwc.int/?r=1827&k=02fcaa0da1	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015),	  15.	  
92	  Gillespie,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  195.	  
93	  Ibid.	  
94	  Ibid.,	  196.	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anthropology,	   nutrition,	   and	   wildlife	   science.	   These	   panels	   established	   some	   basic	  
principles,	  which	  were	  formalized	  in	  1983	  by	  a	  resolution,	  stating:	  
the	   Commission	   also	   recognizes	   the	   importance	   and	   desirability	   of	   accommodating,	  
consistent	  with	  effective	   conservation	  of	  whale	   stocks,	   the	  needs	  of	   aboriginal	   people	  
who	  are	  dependent	  upon	  whales	   for	  nutritional,	  subsistence	  and	  cultural	  purposes	   […]	  
[T]he	   Commission	   believes	   it	   appropriate	   and	   desirable	   to	   establish	   principles	   and	  
guidelines	   for	   the	  management	  of	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	  which	   recognize	  and	  
seek	  to	  accommodate	  conservation,	  nutritional,	  subsistence	  and	  cultural	  needs.95	  
	  
The	   IWC	   also	   established	   the	   Aboriginal	   Subsistence	   Whaling	   Sub-­‐Committee,	  
which	  was	   to	   examine	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   applications	  brought	  before	  
the	  IWC.	  The	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  Sub-­‐Committee	  is	  a	  sub-­‐committee	  of	  the	  
Scientific	  Committee	  of	  the	  IWC.	  To	  apply,	  States	  need	  to	  file	  a	  “Needs	  Statement,”	  which	  
“details	   the	   cultural,	   subsistence	   and	   nutritional	   aspects	   of	   the	   hunt,	   products	   and	  
distribution”	   so	   that	   they	   can	   propose	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	   Schedule. 96 	  This	  
amendment	   to	   the	   Schedule	   will	   then	   either	   be	   adopted	   by	   consensus,	   or	   otherwise	  
voted	  upon	  in	  the	  now	  biennial	  meetings.97	  
In	  the	  current	  schedule,	  the	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  provisions	  state	  that	  
catch	   limits	   for	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	   “to	  satisfy	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  need”	  
shall	   be	   established	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   principles	   stipulated	   in	   Rule	   13(a)	   of	   the	  
Schedule.98	  Furthermore,	   the	   aboriginal	   taking	   of	   bowhead	   whales	   from	   the	   Bering-­‐
Chukchi-­‐Beaufort	   Seas	   stock	   and	   from	   the	  West	   Greenland	   feeding	   aggregation,	   gray	  
whales	   from	   the	   Eastern	   stock	   in	   the	   North	   Pacific,	   minke	   whales	   from	   the	   West	  
Greenland	  and	  Central	  stocks,	  fin	  whales	  from	  the	  West	  Greenland	  stock,	  and	  humpback	  
whales	   from	  the	  West	  Greenland	  feeding	  aggregation	   is	  permitted,	  but	  “only	  when	  the	  
meat	  and	  products	  […]	  are	  to	  be	  used	  exclusively	  for	  local	  consumption.”99	  This	  criterion	  
is	   common	   to	   all	   three	   provisions	   on	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   in	   the	   Schedule,	  
although	   the	   taking	   of	   whales	   in	   the	   Greenland	   area	   does	   not	   require	   the	   meat	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  
(1983),	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=37&k=243b573226	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015),	  38,	  
Appendix	  3.	  	  
96	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  
https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=html_65	  (accessed	  20	  August	  2015).	  
97	  In	  2012	  the	  IWC	  decided	  it	  would	  move	  from	  annual	  to	  biennial	  meetings.	  The	  65th	  
Meeting	  of	  the	  IWC	  in	  2014	  was	  the	  first	  meeting	  on	  the	  biennial	  meeting	  cycle.	  	  
98	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  
Whaling,	  1946:	  Schedule	  (September	  2014),	  Rule	  13(a).	  
99	  Ibid.,	  Rule	  13(b)(1);	  Rule	  13(b)(2);	  Rule	  13(b)(3).	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products	   to	   be	   used	   exclusively	   for	   local	   consumption	   “by	   the	   aborigines.”100	  Perhaps	  
this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Inuit	  in	  Greenland	  do	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  the	  international	  
definition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   as	   they	   are	   allegedly	   not	   subordinated	   in	   their	  
territory.101	  The	   specification	   “local	   consumption”	   therefore	   already	   effectively	   deals	  
with	  the	  issue.	  
3.2.2	  The	  Substance	  of	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  
As	  the	  Resolution	  of	  1983	  already	  illustrated,	  there	  are	  three	  justifications	  of	  aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling,	  namely	  nutrition,	  subsistence	  and	  culture.	  Furthermore,	  Freeman	  
et	   al.	   identify	   several	   additional	   reasons	   why	   Inuit	   whaling	   is	   important	   today.	   They	  
claim	   that	   whaling	   is	   of	   social	   importance,	   important	   as	   a	   source	   of	   food,	   of	   cultural	  
importance,	   important	   because	   of	   nutrition	   and	   health,	   of	   economic	   importance,	   and	  
important	  because	  of	  spirituality.102	  The	  IWC	  defines	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  as:	  
Whaling,	   for	  purposes	  of	   local	  aboriginal	   consumption	  carried	  out	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  
aboriginal,	   indigenous	   or	   narrative	   peoples	   who	   share	   strong	   community,	   familial,	  
social	  and	  cultural	  ties	  related	  to	  a	  continuing	  traditional	  dependence	  on	  whaling	  and	  
on	  the	  use	  of	  whales.103	  	  
	  
The	  same	  IWC	  report	  defines	  “local	  aboriginal	  consumption”	  as	  “the	  traditional	  uses	  of	  
whale	  products	  by	   local	  aboriginal,	   indigenous	  or	  native	  communities	   in	  meeting	  their	  
nutritional,	   subsistence,	   and	   cultural	   requirements.”104	  The	   IWC	   thereby	   confirms	   the	  
three	  elements	  to	  aboriginal	  subsistence.	  Furthermore,	  Jenkins	  and	  Romanza	  argue	  that	  
the	   distinction	   in	   one	   of	   the	   three	   broad	   management	   objectives	   for	   an	   aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling	  quota,	  which	  was	  “to	  enable	  aboriginal	  people	  to	  harvest	  whales	  in	  
perpetuity	  at	   levels	  appropriate	   to	   their	  cultural	  and	  nutritional	   requirements,”	   shows	  
that	   the	   test	   to	  qualify	  as	  aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   is	   twofold.105	  The	   indigenous	  
group	   wanting	   a	   quota	   needs	   to	   show,	   through	   their	   government,	   cultural	   need	   and	  
nutritional-­‐subsistence.	   Jenkins	   and	   Romanzo	   thus	   conclude,	   when	   writing	   on	   the	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  Ibid.,	  Rule	  13(b)(3).	  
101	  See	  Chapter	  1	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
102	  Milton	  M.R.	  Freeman	  et	  al.,	  Inuit,	  Whaling,	  and	  Sustainability	  (Walnut	  Creek,	  
California:	  Altamira	  Press,	  1998),	  29-­‐56.	  
103	  Donovan,	  “The	  International	  Whaling	  Commission	  and	  Aboriginal/Subsistence	  
Whaling:	  April	  1979	  to	  July	  1981,”	  79;	  83.	  
104	  Ibid.	  
105	  Leesteffy	  Jenkins	  and	  Cara	  Romanzo,	  “Makah	  Whaling:	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  or	  a	  
Stepping	  Stone	  to	  Undermining	  the	  Commercial	  Whaling	  Moratorium?”	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  Journal	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  Environmental	  Law	  &	  Policy	  9,	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question	  of	  whether	   the	  Makah	   Indians,	   residing	   in	   the	  State	  of	  Washington,	  US,	  could	  
qualify	   for	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   quota,	   that	   in	   order	   to	   qualify	   for	   a	   quota,	   the	  
indigenous	   group	   must	   demonstrate	   “an	   actual	   cultural	   need	   to	   whale	   based	   on	   a	  
continuing	   traditional	   dependence	   upon	   whaling	   activities”	   and	   “a	   nutritional-­‐
subsistence	  need	  to	  whale	  for	  the	  limited	  purpose	  of	  local	  aborigine	  consumption.”106	  	  
	   Before	   going	   on	   to	   analyse	   the	   three	   justifications	   for	   indigenous	   whaling,	   it	  
should	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  is	  
that	  it	  is	  conducted	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  The	  discussion	  on	  the	  joint	  proposal	  by	  the	  
USA,	   the	   Russian	   Federation	   and	   St	   Vincent	   and	   The	   Grenadine	   in	   the	   Sixty-­‐Fourth	  
Meeting	   of	   the	   IWC	   illustrates	   this.	   Responding	   to	   the	   joint	   proposal,	   many	   states	  
questioned	   the	   aboriginal	   nature	   of	   the	   hunt.	   For	   example,	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	  
claimed	   that	   “there	   had	   been	   no	   aborigines	   in	   the	   Carribbean	   for	   over	   300	   years.”107	  
Ecuador	  could	  not	   support	   the	  St	  Vincent	  and	  The	  Grenadines	  proposal	   “as	   it	  was	  not	  
aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling.”108	  Mexico,	  too,	  stated	  that	  the	  whaling	  in	  St	  Vincent	  and	  
The	   Grenadines	   “was	   not	   carried	   out	   by	   aboriginal	   peoples.”109	  Also	   Colombia,	   Chile,	  
Argentina,	  Peru	  and	  Brazil	  expressed	  their	  concern.110In	  the	  end,	  the	  joint	  proposal	  did	  
not	  receive	  consensus,	  but	  was	  still	  adopted	  by	  a	  majority	  vote.	  Mexico	  explained	  that	  it	  
had	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Russian	  quota	  because	  the	  international	  conventions	  
“required	   it	   to	   safeguard	   the	   rights	   and	   promote	   the	   knowledge	   and	   the	   culture	   of	  
indigenous	   people.”	   However,	   Mexico	   would	   have	   opposed	   the	   St	   Vincent	   and	   The	  
Grenadines	  quota,	  because	  	  
While	   there	   was	   precedent	   of	   approval	   of	   quotas	   for	   that	   country,	   there	   were	  
persistent	   problems	   that	   have	   been	   unresolved	   for	   over	   three	   decades	   and	   those	  
problems	   were	   related	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   information	   on	   the	   history	   and	  
continuity	   of	   this	   whaling	   activity	   and	   how	   they	   respond	   to	   nutritional	   and	   socio-­‐
cultural	  needs.111	  
	  
This	   scenario	   shows,	   although	   the	   proposal	   was	   adopted	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   had	  
otherwise	  ignored	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  indigenous	  populations	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Russia,	  that	  to	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  Ibid.,	  79.	  
107	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  




111	  Ibid.,	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begin	   with,	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   must	   actually	   possess	   an	   aboriginal	  
character.	  
3.2.2.1	  Nutrition	  
According	  to	  Gillespie,	  nutrition	  has	  long	  been	  an	  important	  justification	  for	  aboriginal	  
whaling.112	  However,	   it	   is	  quite	   a	   strong	  element,	   because	   indigenous	  groups	  applying	  
for	  a	  quota	  often	  have	   to	  prove	   that	   there	  are	  no,	  or	   few,	  nutritional	  alternatives.	  The	  
1979	  meeting	  of	  the	  IWC	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  Panel	  confirmed	  that	  “[t]he	  position	  of	  
whaling	   as	   a	   pivotal,	   cultural	   activity	   and	   the	   extremely	   high	   valuation	   placed	   on	   the	  
bowhead	   products	   as	   food	   makes	   such	   replacement	   impossible.” 113 	  Furthermore,	  
Jenkins	  and	  Romanzo	  conclude	   that	  as	   the	  Makah	  can	  meet	   their	  nutritional	  needs	  by	  
relying	   on	   other	   sources	   of	   food	   than	  whale	  meat,	   they	   do	   not	   satisfy	   the	   nutritional	  
need	   requirements	   for	   an	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   quota. 114 	  These	   two	  
statements	   imply	   that	   irreplaceability	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
determining	  the	  nutritional	  element.	  Freeman	  et	  al.	  claim	  that	  not	  only	  are	  whales	  part	  
of	   the	   Inuit	   diet,	   “but	   in	  many	   aspects	   they	   are	   irreplaceable,	   for	  many	   Inuit	   find	   that	  
imported	  foods	  cannot	  provide	  suitable	  substitutes.”115	  Of	  course,	  the	  question	  is	  always	  
whether	   they	  are	  nutritionally	   irreplaceable,	   or	   socially.	   In	   any	   case,	   even	   though	   it	   is	  
alleged	  that	  whale	  meat	  is	   irreplaceable	  for	  most	  Inuit,	   it	   is	  still	  quite	  hard	  to	  fulfil	   the	  
criteria,	  as	  irreplaceability	  is	  quite	  a	  high	  threshold	  to	  meet.	  	  
Gillespie	  notes	   that	  when	  applying	   for	  an	  aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	  quota,	  
the	   indigenous	  group	  needs	  to	  demonstrate	  nutritional	  need	  by	  either	  using	  biological	  
criteria,	  which	  comes	  down	  to	  hunger	  and	  lack	  of	  nutritional	  alternatives,	  or	  social	  and	  
psychological	   criteria,	   which	   includes	   culture	   and	   poverty.116	  These	   are	   alternative	  
bases.	   There	   are	   only	   two	   examples	   of	   successful	   claims	   based	   on	   to	   the	   biological	  
criteria,	   those	  of	  Greenland	   and	  of	   the	  native	  population	  of	   Chukotka.	  Gillespie	  points	  
out	   that	   “[t]he	   key	   point	   about	   both	   the	   Greenland	   and	   Chukotka	   examples	   is	   that	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  Gillespie,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  208.	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  Report	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  Panel	  in	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  
“Aboriginal/Subsistence	  Whaling	  (with	  Special	  Reference	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  Issue	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hunger	  would	  result	  if	  these	  ASW	  claims	  were	  not	  satisfied.”117	  However,	  it	  is	  quite	  hard	  
to	  prove	   that	   there	   is	  no	  alternative	  source	  of	   food,	  or	   that	  hunger	  would	  result	   if	   the	  
indigenous	  group	  would	  not	  get	  the	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  quota.	  As	  Gillespie	  points	  out,	  
throughout	   history,	   there	   has	   often	   been	   a	   break	   in	   whaling,	   leaving	   the	   indigenous	  
group	   to	   find	   alternative	  means	   of	   nutrition.118	  This	   immediately	   undermines	   a	   claim	  
based	   on	   the	   biological	   criteria.	   Alternatively,	   the	   indigenous	   group	   may	   resort	   to	   a	  
second	  set	  of	  criteria,	  namely	  the	  psychological	  and	  social	  criteria.	  
The	   IWC	   established	   the	   psychological	   and	   social	   criteria	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	  
Alaskan	   claim.	   In	   addition	   to	   biological	   terms,	   the	   psychological	   and	   social	   criteria	  
provide	   for	   examination	   of	   nutritional	   claims	   in	   terms	   of	   “possible	   adverse	   effects	   of	  
shifts	   to	   non-­‐native	   foods	   […]	   and	   [the]	   acceptability	   of	   other	   food	   sources.”119	  As	  
mentioned	  before,	  the	  psychological	  and	  social	  nutrition	  criteria	  basically	  come	  down	  to	  
culture	  and	  poverty.	  The	  cultural	  aspect	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Makah	  who	  
contended	  that	  “any	  deviation	  from	  present	  dietary	  requirements	  could	  risk	  introducing	  
diseases	   of	   civilization.”120	  It	   is	   alleged	   by	   the	   Makah	   that	   because	   of	   their	   cultural	  
reliance	   on	   whale	  meat,	   colonialism	   and	   the	   replacement	   of	   the	   traditional	   diet	   with	  
Western	  sources	  of	  food	  would	  pose	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  health	  of	  the	  Makah.121	  Furthermore,	  a	  
lot	  of	  Inuit	  express	  the	  fear	  that	  resort	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  food	  than	  whale	  meat	  would	  
affect	   their	  health.122	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  poverty	   argument	  was	  put	   forward	  by	  St	  
Vincent	   and	   the	  Grenadines,	  who	   argued	   that	   “in	   a	   developing	   country	   any	   additional	  
food	  source	  is	   important.”123	  The	  poverty	  argument	  works	  both	  ways.	  The	  proposal	  by	  
Denmark	  (on	  behalf	  of	  Greenland)	  during	  the	  IWC’s	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting	   in	  2012	  was	  
met	   with	   criticism.	   New	   Zealand	   commented	   “that	   the	   issue	   of	   need	   was	   especially	  
problematic	   for	   Greenland	   which	   had	   access	   to	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   support	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  4:	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  on	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  Sea	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  in	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐First	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  (1980),	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  (accessed	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  (accessed	  21	  July	  2015),	  25.	  
121	  Gillespie,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  210.	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structures	   of	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Denmark.”124	  However,	   in	   2014,	   New	   Zealand	   voted	   in	  
favour	   of	   Greenland’s	   proposal,	   even	   though	   the	   previously	   declined	   strike	   limits	   had	  
been	   proposed	   again,	   because	   it	   “recognized	   the	   progress	   made	   through	   the	   revised	  
needs	  statement.”125	  
The	  Makah	   also	  made	   a	   claim	   based	   upon	   the	   poverty	   argument.	   They	   argued	  
that	   “the	   people	   now	   live	   in	   poverty	   and	   the	  whale	  meat	  will	   help	   their	   nutrition.”126	  
However,	  in	  response	  to	  that,	  Gillespie	  points	  out	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  careful	  with	  this	  
second	  way	   of	   identifying	   nutritional	   need,	   as	   “such	   an	   avenue	  may	   provide	   an	   open	  
door	   for	   claims	   from	  almost	   any	   group	  occupying	   a	   lower	   socioeconomic	  position.”127	  
This	  would	  threaten	  the	  special	  nature	  of	  the	  indigenous	  hunt.	  However,	  this	  critique	  is	  
equally	  applicable	  to	  the	  biological	  criterion	  of	  nutritional	  need,	  since	  any	  pro-­‐whaling	  
community	   that	   once	   relied	   on	  whale	  meat	   could	   argue	   the	   need	   for	   whale	  meat	   for	  
nutritional	  purposes.	  	  
3.2.2.2	  Subsistence	  
The	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  Panel	  defined	  subsistence	  as	   ”the	  personal	   consumption	  of	  
whale	  products	  for	  food,	  fuel,	  shelter,	  clothing,	  tools,	  or	  transportation	  by	  participants	  in	  
the	   whale	   harvest.”128	  According	   to	   Gillespie,	   this	   means	   that	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  
whaling	  hunts	  must	   first	  of	  all	  be	  non-­‐commercial,	  and	  secondly,	   they	  must	  be	   local	   in	  
orientation.129	  
	   The	  requirement	  of	  the	  non-­‐commercial	  nature	  of	  aboriginal	  whaling	  was	  already	  
evident	   in	   the	   1911	   Fur	   Seals	   Convention	   and	   in	   the	   1931	  whaling	   convention	  which	  
stipulated	   that	   the	   whaling	   aborigines	   were	   not	   allowed	   to	   be	   in	   employment	   of	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others.130	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  agreement	  specifies	  that	  the	  skins	  may	  not	  
be	  sold	  for	  profit,	  as	  does	  the	  1957	  Convention	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  North	  Pacific	  Fur	  
Seals.131	  The	  non-­‐commercial	  nature	  of	  aboriginal	  whaling	   is	  crucial	   to	  the	  presence	  of	  
the	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  provision,	  as	  this	  element	  still	  safeguards	  the	  result	  
of	   the	   commercial	   whaling	   moratorium.	   Mexico	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   this	  
requirement	   in	   the	  discussion	  on	   the	   joint	  proposal,	   including	   the	  quota	  of	   St	  Vincent	  
and	  The	  Grenadines,	  in	  the	  IWC’s	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting.	  It	  expressed	  its	  dislike	  of	  the	  ST	  
Vincent	   and	   The	   Grenadines	   proposal	   since	   the	   whaling	   “was	   in	   fact	   closer	   to	  
commercial	  whaling	  than	  to	  aboriginal	  whaling.”132	  Furthermore,	  Brazil	  and	  Ecuador,	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  proposal	  by	  Denmark	  (on	  behalf	  of	  Greenland),	  claimed	  it	  “did	  not	  meet	  
the	   definition	   of	   Aboriginal	   Subsistence	   Whaling	   because	   of	   its	   strong	   commercial	  
component.”133	  During	   the	   Sixty-­‐Fifth	   Meeting,	   Mexico	   again	   objected	   to	   Greenland’s	  
proposal,	   because	   allegedly	   “the	   numbers	   exceeded	   those	   needed	   for	   aboriginal	   use,”	  
and	  thus	  suggested	  that	  commercial	  use	  was	  involved.134	  
	   The	  other	  requirement	  of	  subsistence	   is	   that	   the	  whales	  should	  be	  utilized	  on	  a	  
local	  scale.	  The	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  Panel	  stipulated	  in	  their	  report	  that	  “the	  meat	  and	  
products	   of	   such	   whales	   are	   to	   be	   used	   exclusively	   for	   local	   consumption	   by	   the	  
aborigines.”135	  Furthermore,	  it	  defined	  local	  use	  as	  “the	  barter,	  trade,	  or	  sharing	  of	  whale	  
products	   in	  their	  harvested	  form	  with	  relatives	  of	   the	  participants	   in	  the	  harvest,	  with	  
others	   in	   the	   local	   community	   or	   with	   persons	   in	   locations	   other	   than	   the	   local	  
community	   with	   whom	   local	   residents	   share	   familial,	   social,	   cultural,	   or	   economic	  
ties.”136	  However,	  as	  Gillespie	  argues,	   in	  practice	   this	  definition	  has	  been	  expanded	  “to	  
include	  utilization	  of	   the	  whales	  caught	  under	  ASW	  auspices	   in	   international,	  national,	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  of	  Fur	  Seals	  (July	  7,	  1911)	  (no	  longer	  in	  force),	  Article	  IV;	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (1931),	  Article	  4.	  
131	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  (1973),	  Article	  III(2);	  Interim	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  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  North	  Pacific	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  Seals	  (1957),	  Article	  VII.	  
132	  International	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  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report,	  
20.	  
133	  Ibid.,	  22.	  
134	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fifth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report,	  
para.	  66.	  
135	  ”Report	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  Panel,”	  in	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  
“Aboriginal/Subsistence	  Whaling	  (with	  Special	  Reference	  to	  the	  Alaska	  and	  Greenland	  
Fisheries),”	  Special	  Issue	  4	  (1982),	  35;	  49.	  
136	  Ibid.	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and	   regional	   contexts.” 137 	  Gillespie	   claims	   that	   the	   IWC	   might	   be	   acting	   in	   an	  
inconsistent	  way	  when	  calculating	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  utilization.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
the	   IWC	   drew	   a	   bright	   line	   when	   it	   refused	   the	   Japanese	   small-­‐type	   coastal	   whaling	  
request	   because	   “it	  was	   linked	   to	   both	   national	   and	   regional	   networks.”	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	   “the	   question	   of	   regional	   or	   national	   distribution	   networks	   does	   not	   appear	   to	  
have	  been	  critically	  examined”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  applications	  from	  Alaska,	  Greenland,	  and	  St	  
Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines.138	  
3.2.2.3	  Culture	  
Whaling	   is	   a	   very	   important	   aspect	   of	   Inuit	   culture,	   and	   a	   common	   theme	   in	   songs,	  
legends,	   art,	   dance,	   in	   their	  minds,	   and	   even	   in	   their	   annual	   calendar.139	  According	   to	  
Freeman	   et	   al.,	   the	   whale,	   as	   a	   source	   of	   food,	   “has	   cultural	   as	   well	   as	   psychological	  
importance,	   for	   it	   meets	   enduring	   aesthetic,	   emotional,	   and	   symbolic	   needs.” 140	  
Furthermore,	   the	   Inuit	   share	   the	  whale	  meat	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   community,	   and	   the	  
sharing	  of	   animals	   is	   an	   important	   cultural	   value	   for	   them	  and	   their	   identity	  of	   group	  
life.141	  
As	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  right	  to	  maintain	  
their	  culture	  under	  both	  Article	  27	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  general	  international	  human	  rights	  
law.	  Within	   international	   environmental	   law,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   culture	   also	  plays	   an	  
important	   role.	   There	   are	   frequent	   references	   to	   culture	   in	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  
applications	  going	  back	  as	  far	  the	  1979	  bowhead	  whale	  debate,	  when	  the	  IWC	  requested	  
the	   Cultural	   Panel	   to	   analyse	   “the	   cultural	   activities	   and	   cultural	   identity	   of	   the	  
aboriginal	   people	   and	   the	   relationship	   of	   this	   harvest	   to	   their	   well-­‐being.”	   The	   Panel	  
concluded	   that	   aboriginal	   hunting	   was	   of	   “vital	   importance.” 142 	  Thereafter,	   Japan,	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  Gillespie,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  214.	  
138	  Ibid.,	  215.	  
139	  See	  Freeman	  et	  al.,	  Inuit,	  Whaling,	  and	  Sustainability,	  38-­‐44.	  	  
140	  Freeman	  et	  al.,	  Inuit,	  Whaling,	  and	  Sustainability,	  38.	  
141	  Ibid.,	  40;	  J.R.	  Miller,	  “Indians	  and	  Europeans	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Contact,”	  Skyscrapers	  Hide	  
the	  Heavens:	  A	  History	  of	  Indian-­‐White	  Relations	  in	  Canada	  (Toronto:	  	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2000),	  3-­‐25.	  	  
142	  R.	  Gambell,	  ”The	  Bowhead	  Whale	  Problem	  and	  the	  International	  Whaling	  
Commission,”	  in	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  “Aboriginal/Subsistence	  Whaling	  
(with	  Special	  Reference	  to	  the	  Alaska	  and	  Greenland	  Fisheries),”	  Special	  Issue	  4	  
(1982),4;	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐Fifth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  
Report,	  (1984),	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=38&k=e2a521041f	  (accessed	  22	  July	  2015),	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Greenland,	  St	  Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Makah	  have	  relied	  on	  cultural	  
premises	   for	   their	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   application.143	  The	   IWC	   commented	  
that	   “the	   cessation	   of	   Minke	   whaling	   in	   these	   communities	   has	   affected	   individuals	  
economically,	  socially,	  spiritually	  and	  culturally,	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  threatens	  the	  vitality	  
and	   viability	   of	   the	   communities.”144	  Gillespie	   notes	   that	   the	   “ASW	  hunt	   by	   St	   Vincent	  
and	   the	  Grenadines	  has	   always	  been	   recognized	   as	   ‘cultural	   rather	   than	  nutritional	   in	  
character.’”145	  Also	   the	   Makah	   have	   suggested	   that	   “whaling	   […]	   has	   been	   of	   central	  
importance	  to	  their	  culture.”146	  
	   Although	   the	   importance	   of	   culture	   at	   the	   IWC	   seems	   evident,	   there	   is	   little	  
guidance	  on	  what	  culture	  means	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  an	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  
quota.	   According	   to	   Jenkins	   and	   Romanzo,	   the	   debate	   in	   the	   IWC	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  
Alaskan	   bowhead	   quota	   reveals	   that	   “the	   ‘cultural’	   requirement	   means	   more	   than	  
simply	  cultural	  heritage	  –	  rather,	  it	  connotes	  that	  whaling	  must	  be	  an	  absolute	  cultural	  
necessity.”147	  Only	   two	   guidelines	   have	   been	   established	   so	   far.	   First	   of	   all,	   “the	   act	   of	  
whaling	   must	   be	   central	   to	   the	   culture,”	   illustrated	   by	   the	   Alaskan	   Inuit	   example	   in	  
which	   hunting	   was	   “the	   single	   most	   important	   event.”148	  Secondly,	   the	   loss	   of	   the	  
practice	   “would	   be	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   significant	   detrimental	   impact	   upon	   the	   society	   in	  
question.”149	  As	   such,	   Gillespie	   concludes	   that	   “the	   role	   of	   culture	   in	   evaluating	   ASW	  
claims	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   ambiguous	   and	   problematic.”150It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   these	  
guidelines	  seem	  to	  resemble	  the	  components	  of	  the	  right	  to	  culture	  under	  Article	  27	  of	  
the	   ICCPR.	   The	   requirement	   that	   the	   loss	   of	   the	   whaling	   practice	   would	   have	   a	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  See	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  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  217-­‐218.	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  International	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  Commission,	  “Resolution	  on	  Japanese	  Community-­‐Based	  
Minke	  Whaling,”	  Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Fifth	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  Chair’s	  Report	  (1994),	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  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015),	  21,	  appendix	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  Whaling,”	  218;	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  
Report	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  (accessed	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  August	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(1998),	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  (accessed	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  August	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  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  221;	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  “the	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  International	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  3.	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“significant	  detrimental	   impact”	  sounds	  very	  similar	   to	   the	   threshold	  of	  a	   “substantive	  
negative	  impact”	  introduced	  by	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  in	  the	  Poma	  Poma	  v.	  Peru	  
case.151	  
There	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   vague	   criterion	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   cultural	   element	   of	  
aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling,	   namely	   that	   the	   cultural	   practice	   should	   be	   long-­‐
standing	   and	   unbroken.152	  This	   criterion	   of	   culture	   as	   an	   unbroken	   and	   established	  
practice	   causes	   difficulties	   for	   indigenous	   groups	   with	   relatively	   new	   traditions.	  
Gillespie	  notes,	  as	  an	  example,	  St	  Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines,	  who	  have	  been	  questioned	  
about	  how	  their	  claim,	  “based	  on	  a	  relatively	  recent	  [150	  years	  old]	  tradition	  reflected	  
traditional	  indigenous	  practices.”153	  The	  case	  of	  the	  Makah	  illustrates	  another	  difficulty.	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  with	  the	  Makah	  application	  is	  the	  community’s	  70	  year	  break	  
in	  whaling,	  which	   suggests	   that	   the	  whaling	   is	   culturally	   less	   important	   and	   therefore	  
fails	   to	   satisfy	   the	   very	   vague	   requirements	   of	   the	   cultural	   element	   of	   aboriginal	  
subsistence	   whaling.154	  Similarly,	   the	   Chukotka	   and	   at	   least	   one	   Alaskan	   community	  
took	  a	  break	  from	  whaling,	  either	  voluntarily	  or	  somewhat	  forced	  by	  the	  former	  Soviet	  
Union.155	  This	  vague	  criterion	  of	  a	  long-­‐standing	  and	  unbroken	  cultural	  tradition	  poses	  a	  
problem	  for	  the	  revitalization	  of	  cultures	  that	  used	  to	  hunt	  for	  whales.	  As	  it	  stands,	  the	  
problem	   of	   cultural	   revitalization,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling,	  
has	   not	   been	   considered	   as	   a	   sufficient	   justification.156	  As	   a	   solution	   to	   this	   problem,	  
Gillespie	   suggests	   that	   by	   “retrospectively	   stretching	   the	   precept	   advanced	   by	   the	  
Cultural	   Anthropology	   Panel	   that	   the	   loss	   of	  whaling	   practice	   did	   (as	   opposed	   to	  was	  
likely	   to)	   have	   a	   significant	   detrimental	   impact	   upon	   previously	   whaling	   indigenous	  
cultures,	   it	   could	   then	   be	   suggested	   that	   revitalization	   could	   be	   a	   sufficient	  
justification.”157	  Although	   this	   makes	   sense,	   it	   delves	   into	   philosophical	   questions	   on	  
whether	  the	  act	  of	  whaling	  can	  be	  “central	   to	   the	  culture”,	  when	  that	  culture	  has	  been	  
infringed	   upon	   before,	   and	   whether	   reparative	   justice,	   which	   this	   would	   essentially	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come	  down	  to,	  is	  a	  sufficient	  justification	  for	  granting	  an	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  
quota.158	  
3.2.3	  Limitations	  to	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  
Although	   there	   are	   many	   justifying	   elements	   to	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	  
provisions,	   there	  are	  also	   limitations	  on	  the	  right	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  to	  whale.	  This	  
section	   discusses	   three	   overall	   limitations:	   the	   specific	   boundaries	   to	   the	   allowable	  
catches	  set	  by	  the	  IWC,	  the	  requirement	  of	  sustainability	  and	  conservation,	  and	  the	  issue	  
of	  indigenous	  representation	  at	  the	  IWC.	  
The	   IWC	   has	   placed	   straightforward	   limitations	   on	   the	   aboriginal	   whaling	  
catches.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   IWC,	   through	   its	   Schedule,	   specifies	   which	  whale	   species	   are	  
allowed	   to	  be	   taken,	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  Furthermore,	   the	   IWC’s	  Schedule	  now	   forbids	  
the	  hunting	  of	  calves	  or	  suckling	  whales,	  immature	  whales,	  or	  female	  whales	  which	  are	  
accompanied	  by	  calves.159	  There	  has	  also	  been	  a	  development	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  means	  
of	   hunting.	   Traditional	   hunting	   practices	   have	   often	   been	   replaced	   by	   humane	   killing	  
alternatives.160	  This	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   IWC	   abandoned	   the	   approach	   of	  
identifying	  legitimate	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  claims	  because	  of	  their	  traditional,	  
somewhat	   inhumane,	   hunting	   practices,	   an	   approach	   that	   was	   already	   present	   in	   the	  
first	  Whaling	  Convention	  of	  1931.161	  
	   The	   Schedule	   specifies	   the	   specific	   species	   which	   can	   be	   taken	   as	   part	   of	   its	  
overall	   duty	   to	   preserve	   endangered	   species.	   Gillespie	   suggests	   that	  while	   there	   is	   no	  
specific	   provision	   in	   the	   ICRW	   to	   this	   effect,	   “such	   a	   mandate	   is	   part	   of	   customary	  
international	  environmental	  law.”162	  Gillespie	  suggests	  that	  are	  several	  treaties	  support	  
the	  rule	   that	   taking	  animals	   for	   indigenous	  need	  should	  only	  be	  done	   if	   the	  practice	   is	  
sustainable.	   These	   treaties	   include	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Conservation	   of	   Migratory	  
Species	  of	  Wild	  Animals	  (CMS),	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  European	  
Wildlife	   and	  Natural	  Habitats,	   the	  Protocol	  Concerning	  Protected	  Areas	  of	  Wild	  Fauna	  
and	   Flora	   in	   the	   Eastern	   African	   Region,	   and	   the	   1990	   Protocol	   Concerning	   Specially	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  For	  more	  extensive	  discussions	  on	  cultural	  responsibility	  and	  liability	  within	  the	  
IWC,	  see	  Gillespie,	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling,”	  223-­‐224.	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  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  
Whaling,	  1946:	  Schedule	  (September	  2014),	  Rule	  13(a)(4);	  Rule	  14.	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  Gillespie,	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Protected	  Areas	  and	  Wildlife	  to	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  and	  Development	  of	  
the	   Marine	   Environment	   of	   the	  Wide	   Caribbean	   Region,	   the	   1974	   Agreement	   for	   the	  
Protection	  of	  Migratory	  Birds	  and	  Birds	   in	  Danger	  of	  Extinction,	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  
Conservation	   of	   African-­‐Eurasian	  Migratory	  Waterbirds,	   and	   the	   1966	   Inter-­‐American	  
Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   and	   Conservation	   of	   Sea	   Turtles.163 	  The	   Resolution	  
Concerning	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  implies	  that	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  
should	   be	   “consistent	   with	   effective	   conservation	   of	   whale	   stocks.”164	  In	   general,	   the	  
Schedule	  is	  now	  concerned	  with	  the	  conservation	  (rather	  than	  the	  exploitation)	  of	  whale	  
species,	   whether	   referring	   to	   commercial	   whaling,	   scientific	   whaling,	   or	   aboriginal	  
subsistence	  whaling.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  IWC	  limits	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  quota	  to	  
a	   specific	  number	  and	   species.	   It	   is	  questionable	  what	   “effective	   conservation”	  means,	  
whether	   the	   prohibition	   on	   taking	   females	   with	   calves,	   for	   example,	   satisfies	   this,	   or	  
whether	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   limited	   number	   and	   species	   of	  whales	   that	   are	   allowed	   to	   be	  
taken.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  forms	  a	  limitation	  imposed	  upon	  indigenous	  whaling.	  	  
	   Another	   limitation	   on	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling,	   albeit	   of	   a	   different	  
character,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  do	  not	  have	  much	  of	  a	  role	  to	  play	  within	  
the	   IWC,	   even	   though	   in	   1982	   the	   Commission	   recognised	   their	   full	   participation	   as	  
essential.165	  As	  Hossain	   explains,	   the	   only	  way	   for	   an	   indigenous	   people	   to	   have	   their	  
quota	   extended,	   or	   even	   granted	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   is	   to	   act	   through	   their	   national	  
authority.166	  That	  national	  authority	  can	  then	  make	  a	  formal	  proposal	  on	  their	  behalf	  to	  
the	  IWC.	  There	  is	  no	  specific	  treaty	  provision	  that	  requires	  a	  state	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  ASW,	  
although	   arguably	   Article	   1	   and	   Article	   27	   of	   the	   ICCPR	   support	   such	   a	   duty.	   The	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  Wild	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  of	  the	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  of	  the	  Wide	  
Caribbean	  Region	  (1990),	  Article	  14;	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Migratory	  Birds	  and	  
Birds	  in	  Danger	  of	  Extinction	  (1974),	  Article	  II(1)(d);	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  
African-­‐Eurasian	  Migratory	  Waterbirds	  (1995);	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  for	  the	  
Protection	  and	  Conservation	  of	  Sea	  Turtles	  (1966),	  Article	  IV.3.	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  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  
Report	  (1983),	  38,	  Appendix	  3.	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  Ibid.	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  Kamrul	  Hossain,	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  by	  Indigenous	  Peoples	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Regulated?”	  International	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indigenous	  peoples	  are	  thus	  in	  any	  case	  dependent	  on	  their	  national	  authority	  to	  act	  on	  
their	  behalf.	  	  
Indigenous	  people	  are,	  indirectly,	  also	  dependent	  on	  other	  national	  governments.	  
The	   amendment	   to	   the	   Schedule	  has	   to	   be	   adopted	   either	   by	   consensus,	   or	   through	   a	  
vote	  at	   the	   IWC.	   Indirectly,	   the	   indigenous	  peoples’	  opportunity	   to	  continue	  aboriginal	  
whaling	   is	   thus	   subject	   to	   politics.	   Greenland’s	   proposal	   for	   the	   amendment	   of	   the	  
Schedule,	   for	  example,	  was	  rejected	  in	  2012,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  other	  states	  were	  
not	   convinced	  of	   the	  need.167In	   addition	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   indigenous	  people	  depend	  on	  
their	  national	  government	  to	  argue	  their	  case,	  their	  case	  is	  subject	  to	  politics.	  	   	  
3.2.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
This	  section	  has	  explored	   the	  origins	  of	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling,	   the	  substance,	  
including	   three	   justifications	   for	  aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling:	  nutrition,	   subsistence	  
and	   culture,	   and	   several	   limitations.	  Heinämäki	   concludes	   that	   although	   it	   seems	   as	   if	  
the	  three	  elements	  to	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  are	  separate,	  in	  practice,	  however,	  
the	   requirement	   of	   subsistence	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   main	   category,	   including	   ‘food’	   by	  
definition,	  whereas	  nutritional	  and	  cultural	  needs	  would	  be	  subcategories.168	  However,	  
she	   also	   states	   that	   “[t]he	   fact	   that	   the	   IWC	  has	   started	   increasingly	   to	   recognize	   and	  
emphasize	  the	  cultural	  value	  of	  whaling,	  instead	  of	  nutritional	  need,	  reflects	  the	  present	  
rules	   of	   international	   law,	   according	   to	   which	   the	   right	   to	   culture	   and	   traditional	  
livelihoods	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  a	  well-­‐established	  and	  profound	  status.”169	   	  
	   Through	   this	   quote,	  Heinämäki	   illustrates	   the	   interdisciplinary	   character	   of	   the	  
issue	   in	   this	   thesis.	   To	   be	   able	   to	   establish	   how	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
harvest	  marine	  mammals	   are	   recognized	   in	   international	   law,	   one	   should	   draw	   from	  
various	  bodies	  of	  law.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  indigenous	  harvesting	  
rights,	   different	   areas	   of	   international	   law	   complement	   each	   other.	   Within	   the	   IWC	  
framework,	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  an	  play	  a	  very	   important	  role.	  Evidence	  of	  
this	   is	  already	  visible	   in	  the	  most	  recent	  IWC	  Reports.	  During	  the	  Sixty-­‐Second	  Annual	  
Meeting	   in	   2010,	   the	   Greenland	  Minister	   of	   Fisheries,	   Hunting	   and	  Agriculture,	   in	   the	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  International	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  Commission,	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  of	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  Report,	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  Leena	  Heinämäki,	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discussion	   on	   the	   proposed	   Schedule	   amendment	   from	  Denmark,	   argued	   that	   the	   UN	  
Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   “would	   be	   violated	   if	   a	   satisfactory	  
solution	   Greenland’s	   request	   could	   not	   be	   obtained	   at	   the	   current	   meeting.”170 	  In	  
particular,	   she	   referred	   to	   UNDRIP’s	   articles	   on	   the	   right	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
determine	  their	  own	   identity	  and	  membership,	  as	  well	  as	   their	  self-­‐determination	  and	  
their	   own	   means	   of	   subsistence	   and	   economic	   and	   social	   development.171	  This	   was	  
confirmed	   by	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Organisation	   of	   Fishermen	   and	   Hunters	   in	  
Greenland.172	  
Furthermore,	   other	   countries	   at	   that	  meeting	   spoke	   in	   support	   of	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	   the	   need	   for	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   quotas.173	  Most	  
importantly,	   they	   believed	   the	   IWC	   was	   required	   to	   “act	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   UN	  
Declaration	   on	   the	  Rights	   of	   Indigenous	  Peoples.”174During	   the	   Sixty-­‐Third	  Meeting	   in	  
2011,	   in	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  US	  proposal	  to	  establish	  an	  ad	  hoc	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  
Whaling	  Working	  Group,	  Sweden	  argued	  for	  the	  IWC	  to	  take	  a	  more	  modern	  approach	  to	  
statements	   of	   need	   by	   arguing	   that	   “the	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  as	  well	  as	  its	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  shaped	  a	  completely	  
different	   background	   for	   the	   Commission	   to	   operate	   under	   instead	   of	   the	   one	   that	  
prevailed	  65	  or	  80	  years	  ago.”175Furthermore,	  Switzerland	  recognised	  UNDRIP	  and	  “was	  
of	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   IWC	   should	   act	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   that	   declaration.”176	  During	   the	  
Sixty-­‐Fourth	   Meeting,	   Switzerland	   reiterated	   the	   importance	   of	   UNDRIP,	   and	  
“highlighted	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  institutions,	  cultures	  and	  traditions	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
engage	   freely	   in	  all	   traditional	  and	  economic	  activities.”177	  The	  European	  Union	  states,	  
too,	   committed	   to	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   “to	   satisfy	   aboriginal	   needs	   in	   the	  
wider	   context	   of	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   their	   livelihoods.”178	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  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=65&k=d31c1a872a	  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015),	  18.	  
171	  Ibid.	  
172	  Ibid.	  
173	  Ibid.,	  20.	  
174	  Ibid.	  
175	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Third	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  
(2011),	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=66&k=9a9f223f3a	  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015),	  18.	  
176	  Ibid.	  
177	  International	  Whaling	  Commission,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report,	  
22.	  
178	  Ibid.,	  23.	  
	   40	  
This	  shows	  how	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  can	  influence	  the	  outcome	  in	  the	  IWC,	  
and	   how	   international	   human	   rights	   law,	   the	   law	   of	   the	   sea	   and	   international	  
environmental	  law	  are	  intertwined.	  
3.3	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement	  
The	  Agreement	  on	   the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  of	  1973	  was	   the	   first	   international	  
agreement	  between	   the	   five	  Arctic	   states.	   It	  provides	   for	  a	  ban	  on	  polar	  bear	  hunting,	  
with	  several	  exceptions,	   including	  one	   that	  applies	   to	   indigenous	  peoples.	  This	  section	  
will	   look	   at	   the	   historical	   background	   to	   the	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement,	   the	   relevant	  
provisions	   regarding	   the	   indigenous	   polar	   bear	   hunt,	   some	   interpretational	   issues	  
relating	  to	  terminology,	  and	  some	  limitations.	  	  
3.3.1	  Historical	  Background	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  triggers	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  polar	  bear	  conservation	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
Soviet	   Union	   had	   banned	   the	   polar	   bear	   hunt	   in	   1965,	   and	   argued	   that	   other	   Arctic	  
states	  should	  follow	  suit.179	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  requested	  the	  International	  Union	  for	  the	  
Conservation	  of	  Nature	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  (IUCN)	  to	  encourage	  the	  other	  four	  Arctic	  
governments	  to	  ban	  all	  polar	  bear	  hunting	  for	  five	  years.	  However,	  this	  was	  not	  possible	  
for	   the	   other	   Arctic	   nations,	   as	   polar	   bear	   hunting	   was	   often	   part	   of	   the	   culture	   and	  
economic	  base	  of	  indigenous	  peoples.180	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Arctic	  states	  realized	  the	  
importance	  of	  an	   international	  agreement	  on	  the	  conservation	  of	  polar	  bears.	   In	  1972,	  
the	   IUCN	   submitted	   a	   draft	   version	   of	   an	   agreement.	   One	   factor	   that	   complicated	  
negotiations	  was	  that	  negotiations	  were	  also	  ongoing	  at	  the	  time	  for	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
Convention.	   Besides	   discussions	   on	   the	   jurisdictional	   boundaries,	   the	   need	   for	  
indigenous	  people	  to	  maintain	  their	  hunting	  was	  also	  discussed,	  although	  there	  was	  no	  
representation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   at	   the	  meeting.181	  The	   official	   negotiations	   for	   a	  
polar	  bear	  agreement	  started	  in	  Oslo	  in	  November	  1973	  and	  concluded	  with	  the	  signing	  
of	  the	  treaty	  on	  15th	  November	  1973.182	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3.3.2	  The	  Indigenous	  Polar	  Bear	  Hunting	  Provisions	  
In	   the	   current	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement,	   Article	   I	   states	   that	   “[t]he	   taking	   of	   polar	   bears	  
shall	  be	  prohibited	  except	  as	  provided	  in	  Article	  III.”183	  Article	  III	  provides	  that:	  
Subject	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   Articles	   II	   and	   IV	   any	   Contracting	   Party	  may	   allow	   the	  
taking	  of	  polar	  bears	  when	  such	  taking	  is	  carried	  out:	  
a) for	  bona	  fide	  scientific	  purposes;	  or	  
b) by	  that	  Party	  for	  conservation	  purposes;	  or	  
c) to	   prevent	   serious	   disturbance	   of	   the	   management	   of	   other	   living	   resources,	  
subject	  to	  forfeiture	  to	  that	  Party	  of	  the	  skins	  and	  other	   items	  of	  value	  resulting	  
from	  such	  taking;	  or	  
d) by	  local	  people	  using	  traditional	  methods	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  traditional	  rights	  
and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  that	  Party;	  or	  
e) wherever	   polar	   bears	   have	   or	  might	   have	   been	   subject	   to	   taking	   by	   traditional	  
means	  by	  its	  nationals.184	  	  
	  
Subparagraph	   (d)	   and	   (e)	   are	   applicable	   to	   the	   indigenous	   polar	   bear	   hunt.	   Article	   II	  
requires	   Contracting	   Parties	   to	   take	   action	   to	   protect	   the	   polar	   bears’	   ecosystem.185	  
Article	  IV	  prohibits	  “[t[he	  use	  of	  aircraft	  and	  large	  motorized	  vessels	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
taking	   polar	   bears,”	   except	   “where	   the	   application	   of	   such	   prohibition	   would	   be	  
inconsistent	  with	  domestic	  laws.”186	  
Paragraph	   2	   of	   Article	   III	   provides	   that	   the	   skins	   and	   other	   items	   of	   value	  
resulting	  from	  the	  taking	  of	  polar	  bears	  shall	  not	  be	  available	  for	  commercial	  purposes,	  
but	  only	  in	  reference	  to	  subparagraphs	  (b)	  and	  (c).187	  Thus,	  bears	  taken	  by	  a	  Contracting	  
Party	  for	  conservation	  purposes,	  or	  to	  prevent	  serious	  disturbance	  of	  the	  management	  
of	   other	   living	   resources,	   cannot	   be	   used	   for	   commercial	   purposes.	   However,	   this	  
provision	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  indigenous	  take.	  Thus,	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  allowed	  
to	  use	  the	  skins	  and	  other	  items	  of	  value	  for	  commercial	  purposes,	  unlike	  the	  situation	  
regarding	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling.	  	  
In	   an	   earlier	  draft	   of	   the	   final	  Agreement,	  Article	   III	   limited	   the	   taking	  of	   polar	  
bears	   to	   local	  people	   “who	  depend	  on	   the	   resource.”188	  However,	   although	   the	  US	  and	  
Norway	   approved	   of	   this	   clause,	   Canada	   insisted	   upon	   removing	   the	   reference	   to	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dependence.	   According	   to	   Baur,	   Canada	   was	   afraid	   that	   the	   clause	   would	   “preclude	  
taking	  for	  cultural	  purposes.”189	  	  
3.3.3	  Terminology	  
Somewhat	   surprisingly,	   the	   term	   “indigenous”	   was	   not	   used	   in	   the	   Polar	   Bear	  
Agreement,	   even	   though	   the	   negotiations	   did	   cover	   indigenous	   hunting	   rights	  
specifically.	  The	  Agreement	  used	  “local	  people”	  instead,	  because	  under	  the	  Alaska	  State	  
Constitution	  wildlife	  privileges	  cannot	  be	  based	  on	  race.190	  According	   to	  Hossain,	  even	  
though	  the	  term	  “local	  people”	  is	  used,	  it	  obviously	  refers	  to	  indigenous	  peoples,	  as	  there	  
are	   no	   other	   local	   people	   in	   the	   Arctic	   states	   that	   could	   have	   possessed	   traditional	  
hunting	   rights	   of	   polar	   bears.191	  Even	   so,	   this	   has	   led	   to	   some	   problems	   with	   the	  
population	  on	  Svalbard.	  The	  Norwegians	  living	  in	  Svalbard	  argued	  that	  they	  should	  also	  
be	   recognized	   as	   a	   local	   people,	   and	   thus	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   continue	   polar	   bear	  
hunting.	  In	  response,	  the	  Norwegian	  government	  rejected	  these	  domestic	  claims,	  as	  the	  
population	  in	  Svalbard	  is	  a	  very	  temporary	  one	  –	  Norwegians	  normally	  only	  live	  5	  years	  
on	   the	   archipelago	   before	   moving	   back	   to	   the	   mainland	   again,	   and	   do	   not	   exercise	  
“traditional	  rights.”192	  	  
	   The	  phrase	  “traditional	  rights”	  has	  created	  some	  controversy	  by	   itself.	  Does	  the	  
Inuit	  sport	  hunting	  business	   fall	  under	  the	  provision,	   for	  example?	  “Traditional	  rights”	  
are	   not	   defined	   in	   the	   Polar	   Bear	   Agreement.	   Neither	   are	   “traditional	   means”,	   as	  
included	  in	  subparagraph	  (e)	  of	  Article	  III,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  this	  may	  refer	  to	  
“traditional	   killing	   methods,	   not	   necessarily	   traditional	   subsistence	   purposes.” 193	  
Traditional	  rights,	  however,	  do	  not	  have	  such	  a	  presumed	  definition,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  
useful	  to	  look	  at	  how	  Canada	  defines	  the	  legally	  recognized	  concept	  of	  “inherent	  rights	  
of	  aboriginal	  peoples”	  in	  Canada.	  There,	   inherent	  rights	  include	  “traditional	  livelihoods	  
and	  cultural	  practices	  manifested	  before	  the	  European	  Contact,	  thus	  explicitly	  excluding	  
livelihoods	   that	   have	   emerged	   only	   after	   the	   process	   of	   colonization.”194	  Furthermore,	  
the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  proclaimed	  that	  for	  any	  practice,	  tradition	  or	  custom	  to	  be	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regarded	   as	   an	   aboriginal	   rights,	   it	   must	   be	   “distinctive,”	   central	   and	   integral	   to	   the	  
Aboriginal	  culture.195	  
Baur	  has	  illustrated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  difference	  between	  subparagraph	  
(d)	  and	  (e)	  of	  Article	  III.	  Subparagraph	  (d)	  states	  that	  Contracting	  Parties	  may	  allow	  the	  
taking	  of	  polar	  bears	  “by	  local	  people	  using	  traditional	  methods	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  
traditional	   rights	   and	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   laws	   of	   that	   Party.”196	  Subparagraph	   (e)	  
provides	  that	  polar	  bears	  may	  be	  taken	  “wherever	  polar	  bears	  have	  or	  might	  have	  been	  
subject	   to	   taking	   by	   traditional	   means	   by	   its	   nationals.”197	  When	   reading	   these	   two	  
provisions	   together,	   there	   are	   two	   ways	   to	   interpret	   them.	   First,	   Baur	   explains	   how	  
organisations	   concerned	   about	   polar	   bear	   conservation	   believe	   that	   the	   provision	   (e)	  
provides	  that	  only	  the	  State’s	  nationals	  can	  hunt	  for	  polar	  bears	  “wherever	  bears	  have	  or	  
might	  have	  been	   subject	   to	   taking	  by	   traditional	  means.”198	  This	   view	   is	   supported	  by	  
the	   reasoning	   that	   if	   the	   “by	   its	   nationals”	   phrase	   “must	   be	   given	   meaning	   beyond	  
geographic	   considerations,”	   because	   otherwise	   subparagraph	   (d)	   would	   be	  
superfluous.199	  
Baur,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   subparagraph	   (e)	   provides	   that	  
anyone	   is	   allowed	   to	  hunt	  polar	  bears,	   as	   long	  as	   the	  hunt	   takes	  place	   in	  areas	  where	  
nationals	  have	  or	  might	  have	  taken	  polar	  bears	  by	  traditional	  means.200	  He	  claims	  there	  
are	   areas	   in	   the	   Arctic	   that	   would	   not	   satisfy	   the	   geographical	   requirement	   of	   (e),	  
meaning	   that	   in	   these	   areas	   no	   prior	   take	   of	   polar	   bears	   by	   traditional	   means	   has	  
occurred,	  or	  was	  likely	  to	  have	  occurred.201	  This	  means	  that	  this	  area	  would	  be	  excluded	  
from	  the	  application	  of	  subparagraph	  (e),	  whereas	  local	  people,	  under	  subparagraph	  (d)	  
are	   allowed	   to	   hunt	   polar	   bears	   “anywhere	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   laws	   of	   [the	  
Contracting	  Party],	   so	   long	   as	   traditional	  methods	   are	  used,	   even	   in	   areas	  where	   take	  
would	  not	  be	  allowed	  under	  exception	  (e).”202	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  Ibid.	  
196	  Agreement	  on	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  Conservation	  of	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  Article	  III(1)(d).	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3.3.4	  Limitations	  to	  Indigenous	  Polar	  Bear	  Hunting	  
Although	  the	  provisions	  on	  indigenous	  polar	  bear	  hunting	  seem	  more	  flexible	  than	  the	  
aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   regime,	   there	   are	   still	   some	   limitations.	   The	   most	  
important	   limitations	   discussed	   here	   relate	   to	   conditions	   of	   means	   and	  methods,	   the	  
permissive	  nature	  of	  the	  provisions,	  and	  indigenous	  representation.	  
One	   of	   the	   limits	   to	   the	   traditional	   hunting	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	  
Polar	   Bear	   Agreement	   is	   the	   requirement	   that	   “local	   people”	   should	   use	   traditional	  
means	   to	   conduct	   the	   hunt.	   The	   use	   of	   “aircraft	   and	   large	   motorized	   vessels”	   is	  
prohibited,	  unless	  such	  prohibition	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  national	  legislation.203	  	  
	   A	   second	   limitation	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   of	   the	   exemptions	   to	   the	   hunting	  
prohibition	  are	  “permissive,”	  meaning	  that	  a	  Contracting	  Party	  may	  allow	  the	  taking	  of	  
bears	  for	  these	  purposes.204	  The	  agreement	  does	  not	  impose	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  so	  and	  thus	  as	  
with	   the	   whaling	   regime,	   indigenous	   peoples	   depend	   on	   their	   national	   authorities	   to	  
enact	   an	  exemption.	  Furthermore,	   “local	  people”	   are	  only	  allowed	   to	  hunt	  polar	  bears	  
under	   exemption	   (d)	   “in	   accordance	  with	   the	   laws	   of	   that	   Party,”	  which	   also	   forms	   a	  
condition	  for	  indigenous	  hunting.205	  
Unlike	  the	  International	  Whaling	  Convention,	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement	  does	  not	  
have	   any	   institutional	   mechanism	   such	   as	   a	   Conference	   of	   Parties,	   although,	   as	   Nigel	  
Bankes	  argues,	   “as	  a	  matter	  of	  practice,	   the	  Polar	  Bear	  Specialist	  Group	  (PBSG),	  a	  sub-­‐
group	  of	  the	  Species	  Survival	  Commission	  of	  IUCN/World	  Conservation	  Union,	  monitors	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Agreement	   and	   in	   effect	   serves	   as	   a	   scientific	   advisory	  
committee	   for	   the	  Agreement.”206	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  are	  allowed	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  
meetings	   of	   the	   PBSG,	   as	   it	   has	   been	   recognized	   that	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   both	  
valuable	  and	   important	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  polar	  bear	  management.207However,	   the	   fact	  
remains	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  dependent	  on	  their	  national	  governments	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  voting	  or	  deciding	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  indigenous	  polar	  bear	  hunt.	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Conclusion	  
	  
Both	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  recognize	  the	  right	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  
to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals.	  The	  human	  rights	  law	  perspective	  is	  based	  on	  the	  right	  to	  
self-­‐determination	  enshrined	   in	   the	   ICCPR	  and	  the	   ICESCR,	  and	  the	  right	   to	  culture,	  as	  
reflected	  in	  Article	  27	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  and	  general	   international	   law.	  Through	  the	  eyes	  of	  
the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  scholar,	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  entitled	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals	  
based	   on	   the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	   exemption	   in	   the	   ICRW	   system,	   and	   the	  
“local	  people”	  exception	  to	  the	  polar	  bear	  hunt	  prohibition	  in	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement.	  	  
	   Although	   both	   fields	   of	   law	   recognize	   an	   indigenous	   people’s	   right	   to	   harvest	  
marine	  mammals,	  they	  differ	  in	  scope	  and	  application.	  This	  is	  already	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  
both	  fields	  of	  law	  define	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Within	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  the	  
definition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   includes	   four	   elements:	   self-­‐identification,	  
distinctiveness,	   non-­‐dominant,	   and	   a	   connection	   to	   a	   territory,	   whilst	   retaining	   their	  
own	  societal	  structure.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  within	  law	  of	  the	  sea,	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  
defined	  according	   to	   their	  historical	  ancestral	   link	   to	   the	   lands,	  natural	   resources,	  and	  
their	   traditional,	   distinctive,	   societal	   structure.	   When	   one	   also	   adds	   the	   definition	   of	  
minorities	   into	   the	  mix,	   it	  becomes	  clear	   that	   the	  definition	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	   for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  evolves	  around	  the	  concepts	  of	  historical	  ancestral	  links	  and	  
distinctive	  societal	  structure	  and	  autonomy.	  	  
	   Within	   that	   context,	  human	  rights	   law	  and	   the	   law	  of	   the	  sea	  complement	  each	  
other	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals.	  
Culture	  plays	  an	   important	  role	  within	   the	   ICRW	  system,	  being	  one	  of	   the	  elements	   to	  
the	   aboriginal	   subsistence	   whaling	   provision,	   as	   one	   of	   the	   justifications	   for	   the	  
provision	   in	   the	   first	  place,	  and	  a	  major	  element	   in	   the	   “local	  people”	  provision	  under	  
the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement.	  	  
	   In	  the	  end,	  the	  human	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  constitutes	  the	  major	  building	  
block	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  people	  to	  harvest	  marine	  mammals	  and	  must	  as	  well	  
inform	   the	   proper	   interpretation	   of	   LOSC	   and	   other	   instruments.	   The	   right	   to	   self-­‐
determination,	   in	   this	  context,	  means	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	  shall	  not	  be	  deprived	  of	  
their	  means	  of	   subsistence,	   and	   shall	   have	   a	   relatively	   large	  degree	  of	   autonomy	  over	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matters	  of	  their	  own.	  Hossain	  pulls	  this	  even	  further.	  According	  to	  common	  Article	  1(2)	  
of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Conventions:	  
All	  peoples	  may,	  for	  their	  own	  end,	  freely	  dispose	  of	  their	  natural	  wealth	  and	  resources	  
without	  prejudice	  to	  any	  obligations	  arising	  out	  of	  international	  economic	  cooperation,	  
based	   upon	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   benefit,	   and	   international	   law.	   In	   no	   case	   may	   a	  
people	  be	  deprived	  of	  its	  own	  means	  of	  subsistence.208	  
	  
Hossain	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  mentioned	  in	  
Article	  1(2),	  which	  thus	  would	  mean	  that	  they	  have	  the	  option	  of	  withdrawing	  from	  the	  
international	   regulation	   of	   whales	   and	   polar	   bears,	   and	   “decide	   for	   them[selves]	  
whether	   these	   international	   regimes,	   and	   national	   regulations,	   serve	   their	   own	  
interests.”209	  This	  would	  mean	  that	   indigenous	  peoples	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  
the	  IWC,	  or	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  Polar	  Bear	  Agreement,	  without	  obtaining	  consent	  of	  the	  states	  
in	   which	   they	   reside.	   It	   is	   highly	   doubtful	   that	   States	   consented	   to	   an	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   which	   could	   overturn	   the	   State’s	   sovereignty,	  
however.	  Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that,	  under	  the	  current	  system,	  indigenous	  peoples	  only	  
get	  an	  aboriginal	  subsistence	  whaling	  quota	  if	  their	  state	  applies	  on	  their	  behalf,	  would	  
cause	  difficulty	  in	  a	  system	  in	  which	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  autonomy	  to	  withdraw	  
or	  sign	  up	  to	  the	  ICRW	  on	  their	  own	  behalf.	  It	  is	  a	  very	  far-­‐reaching	  claim	  to	  make,	  but	  it	  
does	   trigger	   interesting	   thoughts	   on	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   harvest	   marine	   mammals,	   and	   how	  
international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  intertwined.	  
	   Working	   towards	   a	   possible	   future	   legally	   binding	   convention	   on	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples,	   and	   a	   binding	   definition	   of	   aboriginal	   subsistence	  whaling	  within	  
the	   ICRW,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   these	   two	   fields	   of	   law	   continue	   to	   cooperate	   and	  
complement	  each	  other.	  Especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	  hunting,	  both	  fields	  of	  law	  
are	  necessary	  to	  navigate	  oneself	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  marine	  biodiversity	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  are	  very	  important	  aspirations.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Article	  1(2);	  International	  
Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  Article	  1(2).	  
209	  Hossain,	  “Hunting	  by	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  of	  Charismatic	  Mega-­‐Fauna,”	  317.	  
	   47	  
Bibliography	  
	  
Treaties	  and	  Conventions	  
Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Government	  	  
of	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  on	  the	  conservation	  and	  management	  of	  the	  Alaska-­‐
Chukotka	  polar	  population	  	  (16	  October	  2000).	  
http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/US-­‐Russia.html	  (accessed	  19	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
Agreement	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Migratory	  Birds	  and	  Birds	  in	  Danger	  of	  Extinction	  (1974).	  
	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  African-­‐Eurasian	  Migratory	  Waterbirds	  (1995).	  
	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  (1973).	  
	  
C169	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  Convention	  (No.	  169)	  (1989).	  
	  
Convention	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  Russia	  and	  Japan	  for	  the	  Preservation	  	  
and	  Protection	  of	  Fur	  Seals	  (July	  7,	  1911).	  
	  
Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (1931)	  reprinted	  in	  P.	  Birnie,	  The	  International	  	  
Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (New	  York:	  Oceana,	  1985).	  
	  
Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (1992).	  
	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  European	  Wildlife	  and	  Natural	  Habitats	  (1982).	  
	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Migratory	  Species	  of	  Wild	  Animals	  (1979).	  
	  
Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  and	  Conservation	  of	  Sea	  Turtles	  (1966).	  
	  
Interim	  Convention	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  North	  Pacific	  Fur	  Seals	  (1957).	  
	  
International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Whaling	  (1946).	  
	  
International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (1966).	  
	  
International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966).	  
	  
Inuvialuit	  -­‐	  Inupiat	  Polar	  Bear	  Management	  Agreement	  in	  the	  Southern	  Beaufort	  Sea	  (4	  	  
March	  2000).	  http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/USA-­‐Canada.html	  (accessed	  
19	  August	  2015).	  
	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  the	  Government	  of	  	  
	   48	  
Nunavut,	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Greenland	  for	  the	  Conservation	  and	  Management	  
of	  Polar	  Bear	  Populations	  (30	  October	  2009).	  	  
http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/docs/GN-­‐MOU-­‐PB.pdf	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2015).	  
	  
Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (1966).	  	  
	  
Protocol	  Concerning	  Protected	  Areas	  of	  Wild	  Fauna	  and	  Flora	  in	  the	  Eastern	  African	  	  
Region	  (1985).	  
	  
Protocol	  Concerning	  Specially	  Protected	  Areas	  and	  Wildlife	  to	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  	  
Protection	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Marine	  Environment	  of	  the	  Wide	  Caribbean	  
Region	  (1990).	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (1982).	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (2007).	  
	  
Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (1969).	  
Cases	  and	  Jurisprudence	  
The	  Mox	  Plant	  Case	  (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Request for Provisional Measures: Order of  
3 December 2001. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee.	  Ángela	  Poma	  Poma	  v.	  Peru	  (27	  march	  2009).	  
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006.	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee.	  Illmari	  Länsman	  et	  al	  v.	  Finland	  (26	  October	  	  
1994).	  CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992	  	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee.	  Jouni	  E.	  Länsman	  et	  al	  v.	  Finland	  (30	  October	  	  
1996).	  CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995.	  	  
	  
Whaling	  in	  the	  Antarctic	  (Australia	  v. Japan:	  New	  Zealand	  Intervening).	  Judgment	  of	  31	  	  
March	  2014,	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  http://www.icj-­‐
cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf	  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015).	  	  
Reports,	  Resolutions	  and	  other	  Papers	  
International	  Law	  Association.	  "Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples."	  Interim	  Report.	  The	  	  
Hague	  Conference	  (2010).	  http://www.ila-­‐
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024	  (accessed	  18	  August	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Union	  for	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Nature	  and	  Natural	  Resources.	  Draft	  Interim	  	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  (September	  1973).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  “Aboriginal/Subsistence	  Whaling	  (with	  Special	  	  
Reference	  to	  the	  Alaska	  and	  Greenland	  Fisheries).	  Special	  Issue	  4	  (1982).	  
https://archive.iwc.int/?r=464&k=dd5e19effe	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015).	  
	  
	   49	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  	  
Whaling,	  1946:	  Schedule	  (September	  2014).	  




International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Second	  Meeting	  (1950).	  	  
https://archive.iwc.int/?r=1827&k=02fcaa0da1	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐First	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1980).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=34&k=0d55a5b7c0	  (accessed	  21	  July	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1983).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=37&k=243b573226	  (accessed	  20	  July	  2015).	  	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Thirty-­‐Fifth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1984).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=38&k=e2a521041f	  (accessed	  22	  July	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐First	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1990).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=44&k=7386e34eb0	  (accessed	  21	  July	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Second	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1991).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=45&k=87d65480e8	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Fifth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1994).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=48&k=f1d2dabe63	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Eighth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1997).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=51&k=7d2011d983	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Ninth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(1998).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=1470&k=e8b706e32f	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Second	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(2010).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=65&k=d31c1a872a	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Third	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(2011).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=66&k=9a9f223f3a	  (accessed	  31	  August	  2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
(2012).	  https://archive.iwc.int/?r=67&k=dbb00dd1be	  (accessed	  31	  August	  
2015).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  Report	  of	  the	  Sixty-­‐Fifth	  Meeting:	  Chair’s	  Report	  	  
	   50	  





José	  Martínez	  Cobo.	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  Prevention	  of	  	  
Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities.	  Study	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  
Discrimination	  against	  Indigenous	  Populations	  (1986).	  U.N.	  Doc.	  
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4.	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  –	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  the	  Promotion	  and	  	  
Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  “Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  and	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Minorities:	  Working	  paper	  on	  the	  relationship	  and	  distinction	  
between	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities	  and	  those	  of	  indigenous	  
peoples.”	  (2000).	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10.	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Division	  for	  Ocean	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Bulletin	  	  
31	  (1996).	  	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee.	  CCPR	  General	  Comment	  No.	  23:	  Article	  27	  	  
(Rights	  of	  Minorities).	  8	  April	  1994.	  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.	  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc0.html	  (accessed	  18	  August	  2015).	  
Academic	  Literature	  
Åhrén,	  Mattias.	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Relevant	  to	  Natural	  Resource	  	  
Extraction	  in	  Indigenous	  Territories	  –	  An	  Overview.”	  Nordisk	  Miljörättslig	  
Tidskrift	  /	  Nordic	  Environmental	  Law	  Journal	  1	  (2014).	  
	  
Anaya,	  S.	  James.	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  	  
Press,	  2004.	  
	  
Anaya,	  S.	  James.	  International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples.	  New	  York:	  Aspen	  	  
Publishers,	  2009.	  
	  
Bankes,	  Nigel.	  “Polar	  Bears	  and	  International	  Law.”	  in	  Natalia	  Loukacheva.	  Polar	  Law	  	  
Text	  Book	  II.	  Copenhagen:	  Nordic	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  2013.	  
	  
Bankes,	  Nigel.	  “The	  Conservation	  and	  Utilization	  of	  Marine	  Mammals	  in	  the	  Arctic	  	  
Region.”	  in	  Erik	  J.	  Molenaar,	  Alex	  G.	  Oude	  Elferink	  and	  Donald	  R.	  Rothwell.	  The	  
law	  of	  the	  Sea	  and	  the	  Polar	  Regions:	  Interactions	  between	  Global	  and	  Regional	  
Regimes.	  Leiden:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Baur,	  Donald	  C.	  ”Reconciling	  Polar	  Bear	  Protection	  Under	  United	  States	  Laws	  and	  the	  	  
International	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears.”	  Animal	  Law	  2	  
(1996).	  
	  
Birnie,	  P.	  “UNCED	  and	  Marine	  Mammals.”	  Marine	  Policy	  17	  (1993).	  
	  
Birnie,	  Patricia,	  Alan	  Boyle	  and	  Catherine	  Redgwell.	  International	  Law	  &	  the	  	  
	   51	  
Environment.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  
	  
Charters,	  Claire	  and	  Rodolfo	  Stavenhagen.	  Making	  the	  Declaration	  Work:	  The	  United	  	  
Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples.	  Copenhagen:	  Eks-­‐Skolens	  
Trykkeri,	  2009.	  
	  
Firestone,	  Jeremy	  and	  Jonathan	  Lilley.	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  	  
Practice	  and	  Revitalize	  Cultural	  Traditions	  and	  Customs.”	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Wildlife	  Law	  &	  Policy	  8	  (2005).	  
	  
Freeman,	  Milton	  M.r.	  et	  al.	  Inuit,	  Whaling,	  and	  Sustainability.	  Walnut	  Creek,	  California:	  	  
Altamira	  Press,	  1998.	  
	  
Gambell,	  Ray.	  “International	  Management	  of	  Whales	  and	  Whaling:	  An	  Historical	  Review	  	  
of	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Commercial	  and	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling.”	  Arctic	  46,	  
no	  2	  (1993).	  
	  
Gillespie,	  Alexander.	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling:	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐	  
Relationship	  Between	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  International	  Whaling	  
Commission.”	  Colorado	  Journal	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  &	  Policy	  12,	  
No.	  1	  (2001).	  
	  
Gillespie,	  Alexander.	  Whaling	  Diplomacy:	  Defining	  Issues	  in	  International	  Environmental	  	  
Law.	  Cheltenham,	  UK:	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  Limited,	  2005.	  
	  
Heinämäki,	  Leena.	  “Protecting	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  –	  Promoting	  the	  	  
Sustainability	  of	  the	  Global	  Environment?”	  International	  Community	  Law	  Review	  
11(2009).	  
Hossain,	  Kamrul.	  “Hunting	  by	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  of	  Charismatic	  Mega-­‐Fauna:	  Does	  	  
Human	  Rights	  Approach	  Challenge	  the	  Way	  Hunting	  by	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  is	  
Regulated?”	  International	  Community	  Law	  Review	  10	  (2008).	  
	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  “Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  Whaling.”	  	  
https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=html_65	  (accessed	  20	  August	  2015).	  
	  
Jenkins,	  Leesteffy	  and	  Cara	  Romanzo.	  “Makah	  Whaling:	  Aboriginal	  Subsistence	  or	  a	  	  
Stepping	  Stone	  to	  Undermining	  the	  Commercial	  Whaling	  Moratorium?”	  Colorado	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  &	  Policy	  9,	  no.	  1	  (1998).	  
	  
Larsen,	  Thor	  S.	  and	  Ian	  Stirling.	  “The	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Polar	  Bears	  –	  its	  	  
History	  and	  Future.”	  Norwegian	  Polar	  Institute.	  Rapportserie	  no.	  127	  (2009).	  
	  
McDorman,	  T.L.	  “Canada	  and	  Whaling:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Article	  65	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  	  
Convention.”	  Ocean	  Development	  &	  International	  Law	  29	  (1998).	  
	  
Miller,	  	  J.R.	  “Indians	  and	  Europeans	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Contact.”	  Skyscrapers	  Hide	  the	  	  
Heavens:	  A	  History	  of	  Indian-­‐White	  Relations	  in	  Canada.	  Toronto:	  	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2000.	  
	  
	   52	  
Miller,	  Robert	  J.	  “Exercising	  Cultural	  Self-­‐Determination:	  The	  Makah	  Indian	  Tribe	  Goes	  	  




Molenaar,	  E.J.	  “Ecosystem-­‐Based	  Fisheries	  Management,	  Commercial	  Fisheries,	  Marine	  	  
Mammals	  and	  the	  2001	  Reykjavik	  Declaration	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  International	  
Law.”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Law	  17	  (2002).	  
	  
Rothwell,	  Donald	  R	  and	  Tim	  Stephens.	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.	  Oxford:	  Hart	  	  
Publishing,	  2010.	  
	  
Sands,	  Philippe	  and	  Jacqueline	  Peel.	  Principles	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law.	  	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  
	  
Tanaka,	  Yoshifumi.	  “Conservation	  of	  Marine	  Living	  Resources.”	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  	  
the	  Sea.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  
	  
Wiessner,	  Siegfried.	  ”The	  Cultural	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples:	  Achievements	  and	  	  
Continuing	  Challenges,”	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  22	  no.	  1	  
(2011).	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
